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It’s Taxation, Stupid
No one can possibly doubt that tax harmonisation in theEU is with us and not just a slippery slope. The European
Foundation pamphlet, “Moving On Up”, was published in
mid-October and is reproduced in this edition. It was
foreshadowed in my pamphlet, “British and German National
Interests”, published at the end of September. They were at the
forefront of the hue and cry which has dominated the British
press since then and which was the first comprehensive analysis
of the subject. We circulated “Moving On Up” to the Chairman
of the FTSE 100 and to editors of newspapers, the media and
MPs even before the dramatic speech by the German Chancel-
lor which he made to the Bundestag on his inauguration. On
2nd October, Wilhelm Henkel, the celebrated German
economist and member of our international advisory board,
predicted in Die Zeit that the European Union would now
introduce a wave of Keynesian policies stimulated within
Germany under its new government and driven by the new
German Finance Minister and Leader of the SPD, Oskar
Lafontaine. The new Keynesian framework in Germany was the
natural (or unnatural) consequence of the outcome of the
German elections. Germany has decided that it cannot afford to
carry the burden of financing most of the rest of the European
Union, that it will insist on a rebate of its massive contributions
and press for a “full union” and “a common constitution to turn
the EU into an entity under international law”, “the decisive
task of our time” (the German Foreign Minister, Joschka
Fischer, on 25th November), which means a single state, one
country called Europe. The only way the new expansionary
policies can be funded is by spreading tax revenues across the
whole of the European Union in a desperate attempt to reduce
not only unemployment in Germany (now at about 4 million),
but also its exposure to debt in Russia which represents 40% of
money owed to it in that country. In other words, this is not a
technical matter but is at the heart of the fundamental agenda
of the EU and Germany – a superstate.
The Prime Minister and the British Chancellor of the
Exchequer have collaborated with this policy as part of the New
Way for Europe which is the blueprint for a federalist Europe.
They have insisted with breathtaking naïveté that the United
Kingdom can put the brakes on tax harmonisation, but in the
full knowledge that they have already agreed to European
proposals to eliminate so-called harmful tax competition. The
full implications of this policy are now clear and they will hit
the British voter and British business with gravely damaging
results, including loss of jobs, of investment and reduction of
British business elsewhere in the world. One of the prime
objectives of Oskar Lafontaine, as Josef Joffe of Suideutsche
Zeitung made clear in the Sunday Telegraph on 29th November,
is “to Germanise European economic and fiscal policy. Hence
his quest for tax harmonisation across the EU, which really
means hiking them up to the towering German level so that tax
weary German businessmen won’t escape into Holland or
Britain where corporation taxes are much lower.” It is not only
to reduce the overall burden on Germany but also to establish a
common tax regime for the EU which, as anyone can see, will
lead to a single state. As Chancellor Kohl made clear in his
speech at Louvain in February 1996, “European integration and
German national interests are both sides of the same coin” – the
euro. The policy of the former German government is being
pursued with relentless force. As I pointed out at the German–
British Industry Forum on 13th October (and now confirmed
by Josef Joffe), the first victim would be the Stability Pact which
was fostered by Kenneth Clarke and John Major and born out
of the disastrous Maastricht Treaty.
When I put this to the Conference, which was held in the
fateful Locarno Rooms in our own Foreign Office, and
demanded a full renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, I was
told in no uncertain terms by the German ex-Ministers who
were present that this was off the agenda. Yet the German policy
cannot be clearer and British voters and businessmen will foot
the bill, including the cost of equalisation of pensions
throughout Europe.
The British Government cannot escape the misery imposed
by Maastricht without a clear policy of renegotiation. Far from
it, they pursue the same Keynesian policies under the so-called
New Way framework. Yet at the same time they claim they can
veto the tax harmonisation programme which is the means to
pay for that very same framework. They must also know that
the Court of Justice is engaged in bypassing the unanimity rule
on tax. The contradiction stares us in the face, as does the
contradiction between the European Central Bank and the
New Way.
This is not scaremongering, any more than the superb
campaign being mounted by the Sun when they ask if Oskar
Lafontaine is the most dangerous man in Europe and if Tony
Blair is the most dangerous man in Britain. The two questions
run together – for the same reason. The losers are Europeans
and the British people, as I have indicated in several recent
letters to the Daily Telegraph and The Times.
The Conservative Opposition must take heed. The single
currency means tax harmonisation. The single currency is the
Maastricht Treaty, which is now back at the top of the agenda.
We put ourselves in the hopeless position of allowing
Maastricht and EMU to go ahead and the Conservative
Opposition must now call for its renegotiation and apologise
for it as it did over the ERM. Saying ‘Never’ to the single
currency would increase the ‘No’ Referendum vote.
The tax harmonisation programme is a practical matter of
vast consequence to the British people. It is also a political and
constitutional question and I call again on the Prime Minister
to give the British people a White Paper on the issue. In his reply
to me on the 21st October this year he said he had no plans to
do so. Will the Opposition insist?
Bill Cash, December 1998
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Aiming for the Heart of Europe: A Misguided Venture
Extracts of a lecture to the University of Buckingham
by John Bercow, MP, on 15th September 1998
I believe that for Britain to aim tobe at the heart of Europe is a misguided
venture. Tonight I shall attempt to justify
that view by considering five factors: the
conflicting views between Britain and her
continental partners of the aim of the EEC,
now the EU; the impact of the European
Treaties upon this country; the political
motivation for the single currency; the
application of subsidiarity; and the cost to
Britain of her membership of the EU. On
the strength of that analysis, I shall suggest
that there are alternatives to deeper
European integration which all democratic
political parties should contemplate.
The political motivation
for the single currency
This is not the occasion for a detailed study
of the arguments for or against Britain’s
entry to a single currency. However, as sup-
port for entry is high on the agenda of most
of those who advocate that this country
should be at the heart of Europe, it is as well
to look at some of the economic and, in
particular, the political considerations.
A  Economic
British membership of a single European
currency is not an obviously sensible
economic proposition. Our business cycle
has long been out of step with that of
continental Europe and there is no evidence
that convergence, if it happens, will be more
than a meeting of ships which pass in the
night. The start up costs for business will be
enormous, hitting small firms and retailers
the hardest. We could no longer use the
exchange rate to absorb shocks, be they
rises in prices or the impact of natural
disasters. Moreover, membership of a single
currency will prevent member states from
taking policy decisions to react to
asymmetric shocks, e.g. the collapse in
confidence in the Russian economy. The
UK’s pattern of trade is global, not
continental, and that pattern is set to
continue. Sterling does not move with the
European currencies but is influenced also
by the US dollar. Changes in the European
interest rate would affect this nation of
home owners far more directly than those
of other EU member states. This country
has funded its pension arrangements –
others have not funded theirs. A single
observed, “it’s less likely that people will be
able to move to where the work is because of
language and cultural differences”. Above
all, the single currency entails a ‘one size fits
all’ policy. A single interest rate would apply
to every member of EMU whatever its
economic situation. That rate would usually
be either too high or too low. The single
currency would be the permanent form of
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of which
Britain was a member from October 1990
until September 1992. In barely 23 months,
unemployment went up from 1.67 million
to 2.85 million, interest rates were
artificially high for too long and rose briefly
to 15 per cent, thousands of people saw their
homes repossessed and many others were
driven into bankruptcy.
I hope the ten economic considerations
cited above give cause for thought.
B  Political
For me, the political objections to British
entry to a single currency are the most
compelling. Yet I was reminded recently that
the political implications are not always
recognised. An intelligent lady, whom I like
and respect, came up to me and advanced
the most common ‘economic’ argument for
the single currency. “I would like such a
currency”, she said, because I wouldn’t have
to change money when I go abroad in
Europe.” I said that if that was all the single
currency were about, I would agree with her.
“Isn’t it?”, she replied.
Let us be clear. We are not talking about a
common currency, but about a single
currency. Whilst some opinion polls have
been seemingly ambiguous on the subject
of the single currency, these polls, without
exception, have not mentioned that Britain’s
joining the single currency will entail the
abolition of the pound and the re-
calculation of everything into euros, from
shop prices to pension entitlements. Those
polls that have mentioned the obligation to
abolish the pound have all recorded a
significant majority against Britain joining
a single currency. The most recent Gallup
poll, for example, showed that 65 per cent of
respondents were against British entry to a
single currency on this basis and only 33 per
cent in favour. Amongst Conservatives, the
figures were 76 per cent and 23 per cent
respectively.
The legal framework is clear. Under the
single currency, the European Central Bank
will be responsible for monetary policy. It
is prohibited by Article 108 of the Treaty
of Amsterdam from seeking or taking
instructions from any other body, even a
democratically elected body, about its con-
duct of monetary policy. Equally, member
states undertake not to seek to influence the
Bank. So the Bank, comprised of people
whom we will not elect and cannot remove,
will be empowered to make decisions
affecting millions of British people. Yet
their elected representatives have forsworn
any attempt to influence those decisions.
Stripped of the verbiage, that is the brutal
reality of the single currency project. It will
be no use electors complaining to the
Government, let alone their local MP, about
the effect of the ECB’s policies. We should be
mindful too that the Bank intends to
regulate member states’ borrowing and
deficit levels and to bring about economic,
as well as monetary, union. In short, a single
currency means a single monetary policy,
a single budgetary policy, a single fiscal
policy, a single economy, a single Govern-
ment and a single state. This is the federal
European state which many member states
want, which has long been developing by
stealth but which virtually every British
democratic politician except Sir Edward
monetary policy will need to be
accompanied by a single fiscal, i.e. tax,
policy, as the President of the Bundesbank
has freely acknowledged. Unlike the United
States, the European Union does not have
the labour mobility that is a prerequisite
of a successful currency union. The
unemployed of Lewisham will not shift to
Luxembourg to get a job. As the Governor
of the Bank of England, Eddie George, has
The UK’s pattern of trade
is global, not continental,
and that pattern is
set to continue.
4The European Journal • December 1998
JUMP TO CONTENTS
Heath and the Liberal Democrats claims to
oppose. Politics has long been the driving
force of the architects of the single currency.
That is why the convergence criteria have
been fudged – economics plays second
fiddle to politics.
Let the politicians speak for themselves –
Chancellor Kohl, speaking in the Bundestag
on 13th March 1991, said pithily, “however
important the completion of economic and
monetary union it would remain mere
patchwork unless political union were
established simultaneously. These two
undertakings are, in our opinion,
inseparable.”
Yet the prize for candour must surely go
to the former Prime Minister of Spain,
Felipe Gonzalez, who wrote in May 1998,
“The single currency is the greatest
abandonment of sovereignty since the
foundation of the European Community…
It is a decision of an essentially political
nature… We need this united Europe… We
must never forget that the euro is an
instrument for this project.”
The reality is that Britain is a global
trading nation. We sell our wares wherever
we can and our success, especially since our
economy was restored to health under
Conservative Governments, has been
conspicuous. That success is not contingent
upon the EU. Our trade surplus until
recently with every other continent but
Europe is testimony to the fact that we
provide goods and services of a quality
people want and at prices they can pay. That
is why in telecommunications, in oil, in civil
engineering and in financial services, to
name but a few, our trade is soaring. Politics
forms no part of the equation save insofar as
it creates a framework of open markets.
The political argument for our EU
membership is that we carry more weight as
part of a block of countries than if we act
alone. This is what might be described as a
political economy of scale. Yet it is
persuasive only if and insofar as club
members share a common goal. In the
recent round of trade negotiations Britain
had to play along with the French line which
was much more protectionist than our own.
A prime example is trade in the audio-
visual sector in which French brinkmanship
put up barriers to United States products.
Given a free hand, and taking account of
our strong trade relationship with the
United States, it is doubtful that we would
have pursued such a course. We were, in
other words, obliged to uphold a position
directly in conflict with our own national
interest. This is an inevitable consequence
of being jammed into a common position –
a consequence met especially often by
Britain, whose interests tend to diverge from
the continental mean far more than do
those of other states.
Conflict situations do not make a cogent
case for the EU’s indispensability to us
either. In the Falklands, we gained practical
help from the United States and much
vacillation from a number of our European
partners. In the Gulf, the meeting of minds
with our American allies was palpable and
the prevarication of the EU equally so. As
for the imbroglio in Bosnia, the less said
about how the EU acquitted itself the better.
De Gaulle long ago pinpointed the
Franco–German relationship as the key fact
in European politics. He said, “There is an
interdependence between Germany and
France. On that interdependence depends the
immediate security of the two peoples. One
has only to look at a map to see this. On that
interdependence depends the destiny of
Europe as a whole.” The partnership
between France and Germany is akin to
what is known as an open marriage. The
partners row and are sometimes unfaithful
but they always return to each other because
they need each other.
It is a rarely observed fact that some of the
most fervent advocates of closer European
integration pride themselves on being
traditional Conservatives or, as they often
prefer to be called, Tories. A hallmark of a
tradition Tory is an innate suspicion of
grand schemes, overarching theories and
elaborate constructions of any kind. He is
more comfortable with institutions and
power that are rooted closer to home. He is a
pragmatist who wants to see that an idea
works. His is a natural scepticism which
befits a Tory but there is sometimes scant
evidence of it in the attitude of a number of
my Euro enthusiastic colleagues. The
mantra that ‘there is no alternative’ to the
ratchet of Euro integration will not wash.
Neither will the attempt to induce the public
to sleepwalk to federalism by telling them
that it is ‘inevitable’. Such an approach is
disingenuous and a counsel of despair.
There are alternatives. Parliamentarians
owe it to their constituents honestly to
address them.
The people of Britain will never
knowingly consent to be governed by those
who do not speak their language, live in
their country or depend upon their votes.
The power of self-government, the right to
hire and fire our rulers and the capacity to
chart our own destiny are inalienable
birthrights. They should not be traded in for
a mess of pottage otherwise known as a
back row seat at a show called ‘The Heart of
Europe’. Our destiny is surely as a self-
governing nation which trades freely with
the world. The future is bright; the future is
global. Our success in it is dependent upon
the vision, self-confidence and calibre of
our leaders, our businesses and our
workforce.
John Bercow is Conservative MP for
Buckingham and a member of the European
Foundation Advisory Board. He was voted
one of the Spectator’s ‘Backbenchers to
Watch’ at their annual awards on 25th
November. His article ‘EMU – Labour’s
Achilles Heel’ appeared in the March
European Journal. The full text of this speech
will be published by the Bruges Group. [see
page 27] For further details please telephone
0171 287 4414.
The staff of the European Foundation wish all
European Journal readers a happy Christmas
and a prosperous new year.
Tony Lodge, Editor
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Racing to a Crisis
by Matthew Taylor
The past 12 months have been an annushorribilis for the sport of kings. Last
December Sheikh Mohammed, flat racing’s
most wealthy patron, issued an ultimatum
that unless British prize money levels
increased dramatically in the near future, he
and his family – the ruling Maktoum
brothers of Dubai – would relocate their
horses elsewhere.
A month later public confidence in the
sport was rocked by the arrests of three
leading National Hunt jockeys as part of a
Scotland Yard race fixing and doping
investigation. In April the animal rights
lobby were up in arms following the deaths
of three horses in the Grand National and a
month later the Sporting Life, for so long the
public voice of racing, ceased publication
after 140 years.
In July a senior Press Association Starting
Price reporter was arrested in relation to
racing related fraud, and Sheikh Moham-
med gave the sport’s rulers a reminder of his
threats by announcing that next year the
majority of his Godolphin two-year-olds
will be trained in France.
Yet despite all of this damaging publicity,
a far greater danger to the future of horse
racing in Britain lurks in an innocent
looking item of European Union legislation
– a directive on agricultural feedingstuffs
preventing the use of certain drugs on
animals which may be used for human
consumption (Directive 74/63/EEC).
Phenyl Butazone, more commonly
known as Bute, is an anti-inflammatory
painkiller commonly used on racehorses to
treat lameness, sore shins and a wide range
of tendon and muscular injuries. It is the
most effective and efficient painkilling drug
on the market and is used on the majority of
racehorses from selling platers to world
class champions. The EU would like to see it
banned on racehorses.
The reason for this is that the EU classifies
the horse as a food producing agricultural
animal and would like to prevent the drug
from ever entering the food chain, along
with other substances such as Dipyrone or
Buscopan, regularly used to treat colic, an
illness potentially fatal in racehorses, and
several anaesthetics.
Prohibiting such widely used drugs could
transform Britain from a premier league
racing nation into a third grade scaled down
industry which can only hark back to a
never-to-be-recaptured golden era.
The implications are that Sheikh Moham-
med would be forced to take his horses
elsewhere – probably away from Europe
altogether – leading to a mass exodus of
owners from racing in this country. Those
that remain would face considerably higher
training costs and – with Bute no longer
available – a much greater risk of their
horses picking up career threatening
injuries.
The worrying point is that the legislation
has already been passed and is in position.
The only thing which prevents Bute from
being banned on racehorses is a flimsy
agreement allowing the use of the drug if
the horse’s owner signs a declaration
promising it will never be sold for human
consumption.
Mark Collins, chairman of the British
Equine Veterinary Association’s Scientific
and Welfare Committee, is campaigning for
a more solid agreement from the EU. He
explains: “We really want a more permanent
arrangement with Brussels that they will not
simply change their minds at the drop of a
hat and enforce the legislation. At the
moment all we have is a weak promise
which is not satisfactory for anyone. We are
trying to come up with ways to prevent any
more confusion, but the EU are not very
accommodating and we are just coming up
against a brick wall.
“It is a similar situation in France, Ireland
and Italy, where racehorses can obtain
special dispensation, but that is seen as a
one-off rather than as a hard and fast item
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of legislation. Other European countries
where Bute and Buscopan are banned have
no real racing industry any more.
“The drugs which the EU is trying to
prohibit are essential. Nearly every
racehorse is treated with Bute at some point
during their career, some of them even live
half of their lives on it. It is a successful and
harmless painkiller but there has been very
little research conducted on what it could do
if it enters the food chain and the EU seem
to be terrified of a BSE-like scare.
“It is understandable to put humans
before horses. But the vast majority of
horses which race in Britain do not enter the
food chain and it seems ludicrous not to
treat them with drugs such as Bute or
Buscopan if they need it. The thought of a
Derby winner being denied essential
treatment because he might in theory be
used for human consumption is laughable.”
Collins, who works as a vet in York, is
BEVA’s representative on the British
Horseracing Board’s Industry Committee,
and Annie Dodd, the BHB’s Political
Officer, is well aware of the potential
disruption EU legislation can cause. She
says: “There has been very little research
into Bute and the constant threat of the drug
being prohibited means that there is little
chance of obtaining funds for further
research and development.”
At the moment racehorses can be
identified by an equine ‘passport’, and the
BHB is currently looking at implementing a
new programme whereby the horse has a
microchip inserted in its neck, allowing vets
to use a scanner to distinguish the horse and
read its medical record.
Mrs Dodd continues: “Microchipping
would allow us to immediately identify
which horses had used Bute and the
amounts which they had taken, but the EU
have done little to encourage us.” She
continues: “Every time we come up against
the EU we get so many conflicting
responses. No one seems to know exactly
how the Working Time Directive will affect
our stable and stud staff, but we have
already had to take legal advice to make sure
that the racing industry will have a case.
“Some horses require treatment and
attention 24 hours a day and many stable
lads want to earn extra money through
overtime. No one decides they want to work
in a racing stable if they expect a nine to five
job and it seems unfair for Brussels to
dictate who works when.”
The Working Time Directive lays down
rules regarding daily and weekly rest
periods, the maximum working week,
annual holiday and certain aspects of night
and shift work.
Another reason for the confusion is the
Directive’s ambiguous wording. The WTD
states that “employers [should] organise
work … with a view, in particular, to
alleviating monotonous work.” A job that is
monotonous to one person may be
interesting to another. How should
employers implement this aspect of the
Directive ?
Richard Wilson of the Institute of
Directors believes that, “In some areas the
regulations are not clear; therefore a danger
exists that an employer might inadvertently
infringe the Working Time regulations and
thereby risk being taken to an employment
tribunal.” Trainers and owners, beware!
It is no exaggeration to say that the future
of the sport now lies out of our hands; the
only hope is that those in Brussels handle
one of our most ancient and beautiful
sports with the same compassion and care
they have for the standard of their
horsemeat.
Matthew Taylor is a racing journalist with
the Daily Mail and the Independent. He was
formerly with the Sporting Life.
The Working Time Directive (93/104/EC)
• maximum working week of 48 hours (averaged over 4 months)
• minimum of 3 weeks’ holiday per year (rising to 4 weeks in 3 years’ time)
• maximum of 8 hours’ work on night shift
• maximum of 13 hours work in one day
• maximum of 6 days’ work per week
• designated rest breaks
… news in brief
An ulterior motive?
47 German Christian Democrat MEPs have called for the resignation of
the entire European Commission in the wake of the unfolding scandal
over the corrupt misappropriation of funds from the ECHO scheme.
They were joined by the former president of the European parliament,
now leader of the Social Democrat group, Klaus Hensch, who said, “If
the Commission has the slightest spark of honour left in its body, then it
must resign”.
This was all carried as news, backed up with outraged editorials, in
the arch pro-European newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “The
20 Commissioners reign like princes in a court, without public opinion
being able to get a look in. It cannot be overlooked that the
Commissioners and the 24 Directors-General lead a practically
uncontrolled life. Since this system also uses numerous advisers who are
rewarded with fat fees, the temptation to abuse is omnipresent.” [18th
November 1998] The overall budgetary arrangements have also been
attacked by the prime minister of North-Rhine Westphalia. But how can
one explain these sudden outbursts of German anger? After all, although
the corruption surrounding ECHO is indeed shocking, the reports of the
Court of Auditors which reveal that between 5% and 10% of the EU’s
spending is wasted or stolen, are an annual event – as regular as the
autumn leaves that strew the brooks in Vallambrosa. A possible
explanation for the Germans’ protest, therefore, is that it is a cynical
political move designed to bolster Germany’s demand for a reduction in
her budget contribution and an end to the British rebate.
“Tax harmonisation within six months”
At a meeting between Finance Ministers and Central Banks chiefs,
France and Germany agreed to strengthen their co-operation in
economic, social and fiscal policy. They also agreed that a proposal to
harmonise corporate tax within the EU would be decided on during
the German presidency of the European Union in the first half of
next year. France supported that proposal. Lafontaine said that a
common European economic and financial policy was necessary.
“Europe must learn to speak with one voice”, he said. [Handelsblatt,
19th November 1998]
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 EU and EMU: Why the experts invariably get it wrong
by Dr Bernie Moss
The book that I have recently publishedwith Macmillan The Single European
Currency in National Perspective: A
Community in Crisis?  is arguably the first
serious study of the EU from that per-
spective. It is also one of the first scholarly
books – there are several estimable political
ones1 – among literally thousands devoted
to the subject that is critical of the European
project. Most university texts tend to look at
the EU as a sui generis phenomenon, cut off
from foundations in nation states and
economies. The prevailing narrative is
Whiggish, that of the decline of the nation
state and growth of the EU towards
prosperity and ever closer union.
The reasons for satisfaction are few. It is
argued that the EC ended the threat of war
between France and Germany, but that was
really a function of American hegemony
and the Cold War. As to promoting pros-
perity through trade, the performance of
the EC, except for the start-up period, 1957
to 1973, has been mediocre compared to
that of other OECD or Asian countries.2
Manufacturing trade interdependence
among the original six countries has
actually declined since the 1970s and stag-
nated among the others since the 1980s.3
The single market which the Commission’s
experts predicted would add five million
more jobs and seven per cent growth – ‘how
could so many leading experts be so
wrong?’4 – produced the opposite: 7  million
more jobless and five per cent lower GNP.
The single market created greater dis-
parity in unemployment and trading and
business structures.5 It stimulated national
and trans-Atlantic rather than European
mergers.6 Except in the realm of agriculture
where consumers paid a price, European
industry became more dependent upon US
and Japanese multinationals, particularly in
the area of high tech.7
The policies of monetary union have
been particularly destructive. A new econo-
metric study of developed nations finds EU
membership associated with twenty per
cent reduction of annual per capita income,
high interest rates, and four per cent
increase in unemployment.8 The worst
performance began in 1979 with the ERM
by which members were forced to allign
themselves at a high rate with the Germans
whose interest rates were unresponsive to
unemployment. The German economy
worked only so long as there were loose
spending nations able to buy its capital
goods. Once all members adopted hard
money polices Germany too went into
decline. The convergence criteria for the
single currency imposed a deflationary
straitjacket that reduced growth and
increased unemployment in the EU from
nine to twelve per cent.
Why then the one-sidedness of academic
and expert opinion ? Without undertaking a
sociology of academic knowledge I would
propose a few simple explanations. In the
US where most of the early literature
originated the issue was framed in the
context of the Cold War which required a
strong, economically united prosperous
Western Europe to serve as a bulwark
against the Soviet bloc and threat of internal
subversion. American thinking about
Europe reflected US experience with
federalism and the absence of a strong state
tradition. The neo-functionalists saw a
federalist European state emerging auto-
matically out of market and interest group
links much as did Jean Monnet, the
‘American’ in Paris.
British academic literature remained
more descriptive than American, but it
became even more apologetic of the EC for
both institutional and ideological reasons.
At a time when traditional disciplines were
under challenge as lacking in relevance,
European studies became a growth
industry. The European Commission
funded over one hundred Jean Monnet pro-
fessorships in British universities. Teaching
and research shifted from traditional
disciplines and national studies to inter-
disciplinary or undisciplined European
studies. Students became more conversant
with the life of Monnet than that of
Cromwell, Garibaldi or Bismarck.
Given their social background and
situation, most academics were naturally
inclined to the soft left with a cosmopolitan
penchant for the continent, but they
received a jolt from Mrs Thatcher, who
challenged both the assumptions of the
welfare state and of the EC. The traditional
left which had defended the welfare state
collapsed. The European enemy of Mrs
Thatcher, social democrats reasoned, must
be our friend. Hopes for a caring society
were transposed to Europe where Jacques
Delors promised a social dimension. The
fact that Delors produced almost nothing in
the way of social reform did not seem to
matter because Europe had by now become
a substitute for the welfare state.
EMU is a monetarist arrangement for an
independent bank floating free of
democratic control, pursuing the single
deflationary aim of price stability and
requiring strict budgetary discipline from
member states. It is currently being chal-
lenged by Socialist governments working in
tandem in France, Germany and Italy.
They are calling for lower interest and
exchange rates, relaxation of their deficit
limits and their control of the European
Bank, all of which are breaches of the
Maastricht Treaty. They are also negotiating
in the euro council provisions for minimum
wage, tax harmonization and binding
employment objectives and reviving Delors’
1993 plan for investment in trans-European
networks.
At the same time neither France nor
Germany is willing to concede to the EU
more resources or sovereignty; the
Germans, who keep it all afloat, are
demanding their money back. Popular
satisfaction with the EU is at an all-time low.
Members confront intractable problems of
reforming the CAP and structural funds
and preparing for enlargement. They think
they are building Europe, but in the midst of
deepening economic crisis they are actually
rehabilitating the welfare state and thus
destroying EMU.
Bernard H. Moss is a professor of history
associated with the Institute for European
Studies. He was recently a candidate for
Labour Party MEP selection in London.
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Regional Chambers
John Walker reports on further Euro Region developments as Chambers
in the English Regions are due to be set up this autumn and in the process
lay the framework for directly elected Regional Assemblies within a matter
of years. He cites the administration of the Single Market and its currency
as a leading factor in this regionalisation across the  EU, leading ultimately
to a single government for the whole of the EU.
Another key step towards the breakup of England into Euro Regions will
unfold this autumn with the setting up of
Voluntary Regional Chambers in eight
of the nine English Regions, with London
having its own elected authority next year.
These Chambers, not to be confused
with Chambers of Commerce, will have
representation from both the local author-
ities in the their Regions and ‘Regional
Stakeholders’, which include business, edu-
cational establishments and trades unions.
Should Labour be re-elected at the next
General Election, it is committed to setting
up directly elected Regional Assemblies,
where there is a demand for them although
it is unclear how the demand will be judged
as this does not seem to include a referen-
dum. One prerequisite for these Assemblies
will be that the Regions concerned must
have Unitary Local Authorities and no
County Councils, so the need for another
Local Government Review would come into
play and to some extent this explains why
there was one in 1993/4 and the resultant
Unitary Councils in some areas.
On the 16th September in London,
representatives of the 74 local authorities in
the South East, under the auspices of the
year old South East Regional Forum, met to
discuss the format of the new Voluntary
Regional Chamber. Also present were
non-voting representatives of Regional
Stakeholders. The Government, through the
Department of Environment, Transport &
Regions (DETR), is the driving force behind
these Chambers as they are an integral part
of the Regional Development Agency
(RDA) project which are due to start in
April 1999, making the word ‘Voluntary’
rather misleading.
The South East Chamber will have one
representative from each of the 74 local
authorities in the Region plus 33 represent-
atives of Regional Stakeholders to reflect the
DETR formula of 70% local authority and
30% stakeholders. The proposed voting
system however will give County and
Unitary authorities weighted votes and
therefore the influence of stakeholders will
be much reduced from the 30% intended.
A similar process to the South East is taking
place in the other English Regions and any
reader wishing to find out the position
outside the SE can ask their own local
council or Government Regional Office.
These eight Regional Chambers are
expected to be fully operational by the end
of the year.
So what is their purpose, both stated and
unstated? These Chambers are portrayed
as meeting the ‘Democratic Deficit’
occasioned by the Regional Development
Agencies, which themselves were a response
to a perceived ‘Economic Deficit’ at regional
level. Add to that ‘A voice for the Region in
Brussels’ and ‘Devolution’, and the agenda
starts to become far clearer. The European
Spatial Development Perspective (ESPD)
and funding out of UK contributions to the
EU budget acquiring its own regional
agenda will both become leading issues for
the RDAs and Chambers. Spatial Planning
includes: economic development, land use
planning, house building requirements,
waste disposal, integrated transport and the
environment. Whilst ESPD is still inter-
governmental, next year discussions with
member states could see the EU become the
lead body for all the policy areas within
spatial planning. Even if no agreement is
reached, the development of the Single
Market would make one necessary in time.
Far from the devolution of policy making
being taken closer to the people, it could
actually be centred in Brussels with only its
administration and implementation being
devolved to the Regions.
Key to this centralised administration by
Brussels through the Regions is the single
currency. The RDAs and the equivalent
Regional Authorities in other member
states, will undoubtedly be charged with the
very close monitoring of the economies in
their regions so that any problems which
could undermine EMU can be identified at
an early stage. Remedies would no doubt
include structural funds, subject to
availability, and could stretch the ability of
taxpayers to fund. The excellent article by
Jeremy Nieboer in the June Journal referred
to the Commission in the 1970s suggesting
that 7.5% of EU GDP would be needed to
deal with structural problems in EMU; and
that was before Greece, Portugal and Spain
joined. The link between centralising
VAT collection in Brussels and funding
these structural problems inside EMU
should not be discounted, as the 1.27% of
GDP currently paid in contributions may
woefully low.
At the London meeting, referred to above,
it was stated that Government sees a widen-
ing of the policy areas to be administered by
the Regions. Whilst no specifics were given,
this is likely to include Education which is
touching the Government Regional Offices
and already administered by local author-
ities. Add Education to the spatial planning
policy areas, and there is not much left that
could be devolved downwards. In or out of
EMU, the centralisation of most tax setting
and collection to Brussels cannot be ruled
out and when combined with the EU taking
a more prominent role in Foreign Affairs,
and by implication Defence, Westminster
will have little left in the coming years to
involve itself. In fact, the UK’s current places
in the UN, G7, IMF and the Commonwealth
must all come under scrutiny as the EU
continues to develop its own international
status, and this would gather additional
momentum inside EMU. The external
representation of the euro on the G7 is
already a live issue for France, Germany and
Italy, plus of course the Commission keen to
be promoted from ‘Attendance Only’ status
to full member.
The constitutional changes being imple-
mented to satisfy the requirements of both a
Single Market with a single currency and
the subsidiarity sections of Maastricht, are
potentially so far reaching that there will
come a time when Westminster’s very
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existence will be questionned due to it
having little or no legislative power left.
This is being achieved by a combination of
downward devolution to the Regions for
administration direct from Brussels and
upward devolution of other policy areas to
EU Institutions. The fact that the
boundaries for the RDAs, Government
Regional Offices, the 1999 Euro Elections
and the Regional Chambers are the same is
no coincidence. These Chambers are but a
staging post towards directly elected
Regional Assemblies and in turn all but
complete the project of having a European
Union of 111 Regions administered
centrally from Brussels. The continued
existence of national parliaments and
general elections might maintain the
illusion of statehood and the ability to make
our own laws, but for how long ?
John Walker attended the London meeting
referred to in this article as a representative of
a small business organisation or ‘Regional
Stakeholder’, and has been closely following
these issues as they unfold.
Constitutional Government
by David Radlett
The origins of constitutional government lie in the marked and amply
justified distrust of human beings in human
nature. Constitutional government recog-
nises the recondite certitude, born of
experience, that the people in whom we vest
authority over ourselves require restraint by
something more potent than their own
discretion.
This restraint is generally labelled
‘constitutionalism’. Two views can be taken
of this concept. The first is that the
government of a nation state (like anyone
else) can do anything that is not prohibited
by law. At the moment, this sums up the
constitutional position regarding the
United Kingdom. The second view is that a
government (unlike anyone else) can only
do those things which are permitted by law.
This view represents the position in
countries like the United States, and most
other federal states. A common feature of
both views is that ‘the law’ includes certain
basic precepts, like the principles of natural
justice, that create additional fetters on
freedom of government action.
It is the second view that has prevailed in
the context of international law regarding
bodies created by treaty. As the Inter-
national Court of Justice observed in an
advisory opinion on the scope of its powers
in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case
(Second Phase) (1950) ICJ Reports 221:
“It is the duty of the Court to interpret the
Treaties, not to revise them.”
This is a natural fetter on the discretion of
an international, governmental body. The
restraint shown by the apolitical Inter-
national Court of Justice is admirable. Such
is not the case, it is feared, with another
international, governmental body, the
Court of Justice of the European Commun-
ities. The Court is undoubtedly a creature of
international statute, namely the EC Treaty
1957. It is therefore extraordinary that, with
each turn of the ratchet towards establishing
the European Federal State, there is very
little concern amongst writers and
academics about the absence of restraints
on the operation of that Court. In fact, there
appears to be tacit, if not outright approval
of their many assumptions of power in ways
not obviously authorised by the EC Treaty.
This is amply demonstrated in the growing
literature on the operation of the Court.
Take as an example the following passage
from Brown & Jacobs on the Court of Justice
of the European Communities:
“[The ECJ] has a legislative function,
inasmuch as it often falls to the Court to fill
gaps in the legal system arising from the
political impotence of the Council …”
(Brown & Kennedy, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th
edition at p 101).
The desire of the Court to ‘fill in gaps’ in
the Treaty was seen in the Cassis de Dijon
Case [1979] ECR 649. The Court had to
tackle German reluctance to admit French
alcohol to its domestic market. The Court
set out an intellectually pleasing test against
which national restrictions to free
movement of goods can be justified. It ruled
that such restrictions were in accordance
with EC law if they were necessary to
promote effective domestic tax regimes, or
public health, or the fairness of commercial
transactions or consumer protection, but
not otherwise. The difficulty is that the EC
Treaty appears to set out the full extent of
Community law on the point. Both before
and after Cassis there is ample evidence to
suggest that free movement of goods
remains a chimera (see, for example,
chapter 10 of The Castle of Lies by Booker
and North, Duckworths, 1996). The point
here, though, is that another leading
authority on EC law, Stephen Weatherill,
could note, without criticism, that:
“The Cassis de Dijon formula is merely a
particularly high-profile example of [the]
gap-filling function,” (Law and Integration
in the European Union, OUP, 1995 at p. 236).
Needless to write, the EC Treaty mentions
no ‘gap-filling’ function to be carried out by
the Court. Therefore the question is
whether this ‘gap-filling’ function is
constitutional. The basic role of the Court is
set out in Article 164 of the EC Treaty, which
provides that:
“The Court of Justice shall ensure that in
the interpretation and application of this
Treaty the law is observed.”
What is ‘the law’? This question poses
some difficulty. The word “law” in the
English translation comes from the French
word ‘droit’ – as in ‘principes generaux du
droit’ (general principles of law) – used in
the official text of the Treaty. The authors of
the Treaty could have used ‘lois’ (also
capable of being translated as ‘law’). It is
argued that this matters because, in French
jurisprudence, ‘lois’ is essentially written law
and ‘droit’ comprises general principles.
Wyatt and Dashwood write that the use of
‘droit’:
“suggests a corpus juris transcending the
treaty texts,” (in European Community Law,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1993 at p 89).
Some of the arguments regarding this
issue were rehearsed in the article ‘The
Myth of Supremacy’ in this Journal at
(1997) Vol 4 No 4 (page 29). Yet the lois/droit
conundrum continues to trouble, as a
governmental power may be impliedly
constitutional, even if not expressly
constitutional.
Lord Mackenzie Stuart clearly thought so.
In his Hamlyn lectures on ‘The European
Communities and the Rule of Law’ he noted
that:
“[I]n our search for the underlying
concept of [the] court … [t]here are two
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sources to be considered. First, the back-
ground to the Treaty itself and secondly the
tradition of legal control over adminis-
tration which has been developed in each of
the six original Member States,” (Stevens,
1977 at p 8).
It is now common knowledge that the
founding fathers of the Community
intended to bring about a federal state of
Europe. There is a dispute is the extent to
which they were honest about this, with the
current trend being to claim (contrary to all
the evidence) that there was never a secret.
For an honest account of these matters,
Brigitte Boyce’s article on ‘The Democratic
Deficit of the European Community’ (to be
found in Parliamentary Affairs (1993) Vol 46
No. 4) is hard to beat. On the assumption
(supported by Boyce) that the federalists
‘went underground’ after the failure of the
European Defence Community in 1954, the
background to the EC Treaty of 1957 would
suggest that federalism was not on the
agenda. Mackenzie Stuart’s attempt to take
succour from the earlier Coal and Steel
Community Treaty appears ill-founded.
Accordingly, the legal background to the EC
Treaty suggests that the Court of Justice
should regard itself as confined to the
matters in, and the law of, that treaty. The
comparison with the International Court of
Justice is obvious.
To what extent, them, might support for
implied powers to the Court be found in the
existence of a common tradition of legal
control over administration amongst the
Six? Mackenzie Stuart focused on the
position in France. He claimed that French
jurisprudence showed a:
“development of a body of case law
setting forth a coherent group of rules by
which the executive must regulate its affairs
in the interest of good administration and
for the protection of the individual,” (at
p 12).
These are the rules labelled ‘principes
generaux du droit’. Certainly, much of the
hot air emanating from the Court of Justice
suggests that it is applying its version of
these rules in the context of the Com-
munity, and that it has the right to do so.
However, these arguments are based on a
fundamental misapprehension, deliberate
or otherwise, as to the status of ‘principes
generaux du droit’ in (French) constitutional
and administrative law.
The French parliament (consisting of a
National Assembly and a Senate) is
empowered to enact statutes under Article
34 of the 1958 constitution. These statutes
are properly referred to as ‘lois’. They must
address matters reserved to the parliament,
which include civil rights and public
liberties, national defence, personal status,
education, employment and the electoral
system. Outside these areas, government
ministers are empowered to legislate by way
of ‘reglements autonomes’.
The French judiciary has asserted the
right to apply ‘principes generaux du droit’
in assessing the validity of ‘reglements auto-
nomes’. However, there is no power to
judicially test the validity of a French
statute, so ‘principes generaux du droit’ have
no application. For the French lawyer,the
ordinary legal hierarchy consists of statutes,
‘principes generaux du droit’ and ‘reglements
autonomes’ in that order. The ‘general prin-
ciples’ do not authorise the French judiciary
to engage in far-reaching constitutional
innovation.
It follows that the use of the word ‘droit’
for ‘law’ in the EC Treaty has no mystical
meaning derived from French law, and
cannot be used as a valid excuse for the
naked assumption of power that the Court
has undertaken.
Oddly enough, it could have been
different. French law recognises a system of
general principles covering some similar
ground to the ‘principes generaux du droit’,
but which fall to be applied by the Conseil
constitutionnel (Constitutional Council).
The tasks of the Conseil constitutionnel
include the supervision of presidential and
other elections, and ruling on the conform-
ity of proposed new laws affecting the
French constitution with that constitution.
The interested observer will note that this
is exactly the role that the Court of Justice
purports to perform. It dearly wants to be
the collective king of the Euro-castle.
Several articles in the EC Treaty, most
notably articles 169, 173 and 177 authorise
it to pronounce on the meaning and impact
of an item of Community law. These articles
do not, on their face, permit the Court to
make up new law as it sees fit in order to
reach what Mackenzie Stuart and others
refer to as a ‘Community solution’ to a legal
problem. Indeed, in keeping with inter-
national law current at the time of the EC
Treaty, it would have been expected that the
Court would interpret the Treaty, not revise
and extend it
To achieve legitimacy, the Court of Justice
needed to imitate the Conseil constitutionnel
in that body’s development of a system of
rules which it labelled ‘principes fondament-
aux reconnus par les lois de la Republique’ or
‘acknowledged fundamental principles of
the laws of the Republic’. Such broad
concepts are, perhaps, apt to include the
New Legal Order proclaimed by the Court
of Justice, the Supremacy of Community
law and principles of direct effect. But, note
the word used by the Conseil constitutionnel
to describe the basis of its general principles
– not ‘droit’ but ‘lois’!
It is too late, after 40 years and thousands
of words to the contrary, for the Court of
Justice and its apologists to claim that the
use of the word ‘lois’ in Article 164 of the EC
Treaty gave that Court the right to invent
new roles and new doctrines. Such an
argument would simply expose further the
Court of Justice for the bogus apology for a
court of law that it really is. The early
American cleric, William Ellery Channing,
once wrote that:
“False theories, though held by the
greatest and best of men, and though not
thoroughly believed, have wrought much
evil.”
The falsity of the theory of judicial
powers outside the EC Treaty has been
demonstrated. The evil that the citizens of
each of the Member States face is the
untrammelled exercise of illegitimate
political power by the Court of Justice. Sir
Patrick Neill (as he then was) described the
Court of Justice as:
“… a legislative body over which there is
no control of higher authority. We have an
extra wheel on the coach, which is not only
deciding but directly legislating, when it
finds gaps [in the Treaty or] things it does
not like,” (The Times 19th September 1994).
The legerdemain of the Court and its
apologists dazzles both their audience and
themselves, it bestows dignity to meanness
and magnifies the small-mindedness of the
whole project. It gives authority to the
despotism that would otherwise be
regarded as contemptible. It exalts in the
name of freedom that which is but base
servitude. If the idea of constitutional
government requires the restraint of
governmental power, then the antics of the
Court of Justice demonstrate that it is, at
heart, unconstitutional.
David Radlett is a lecturer in law at Mid Kent
College of Higher and Further Education. He
specialises in Constitutional and European
Law and holds a degree in Law from the LSE.
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Will the Euro be a Global Safe Haven?
by Jeremy Stanford
The European Central Bank’s Nero-like statements on world economic
events – “Crisis? What crisis?” – stand
awkwardly beside those of the EU’s new
centre-left political leadership who,
alarmed at the environment of global
economic downturn into which the euro is
being launched, appear ready to bury the
Maastricht rulebook and reflate the euro-
economy by pumping money into it until it
bursts.
Further confirmation, if needed, of the
confused political nature of the project. And
the certainty that little reality will come
from the bureaucrats in Frankfurt or
Brussels until after the euro is launched – as
they stoically try to contain the tensions
within the project, while isolating it from
the real world of currency crises without, at
least until after January 1st.
Yet, with the unerring EU instinct to turn
a crisis into a platitude, the relentless euro
propagandists suggest there could be no
better time for launching the euro: that at a
time of turmoil in financial markets the
euro will offer investors security and stabil-
ity that will rival the global dominance of
the dollar’s ‘safe haven’ currency status. But
on what basis do they make such claims?
Can they be serious?
Those looking for a country or currency
zone with which to trust their future wealth
seek out basic fundamentals: rising growth;
expanding employment; stable politics; an
open economy; low tax rates; low business
regulation; and low inflation.
Inflation in euroland, though satisfactory
up to euro entry, looks set to be a major
victim of the changing political philosophy.
On the checklist above it is clear that
continental euroland scores zero on all
seven fronts.
Furthermore, in contrast to national
central banks the ECB will be dependent on
pooled financial resources. It will lack the
reassurance of the sovereign authority to act
independently as a lender of last resort.
And while the ECB is charged with
independence in setting the euro interest
rate it is, paradoxically, to share exchange
rate policy with euro finance ministers. The
tensions inherent in this Achilles’ heel for
the ECB can only create policy instability. A
recent report by the Centre for Economic
Policy Research warns that the ECB suffers
from serious design flaws “and the con-
sequences of these are likely to surface when
the world financial crisis hits euroland”.
Global crisis and the euro zone
And the euro is indeed being born into a
world of economic crisis: collapsed
economies and currencies; massive
unrecoverable debt; the contraction of
global investment and forward credit by
institutions no longer willing, or able, to get
their fingers burned. Could the euro offer
the investor a stable currency option in such
troubled times?
Consider these disturbing facts:
• European bank lending to developing
countries stands at £530 billion – two-thirds
of all bank lending to emerging market
economies.
• Euroland exposure to crisis-hit
economies is larger in both amount and %
of GDP than either the US or UK. Current
estimates of defaults to European banks
total $185 billion.
• Massive “risk-country” loans by German
banks to former Soviet states were
guaranteed by the Bundesbank. The cost of
meeting defaults is expected to increase
Germany’s fiscal deficit by 1% of GDP next
year – challenging the fragile ‘Growth and
Stability’ Pact.
• Limits on future business lending by
Germany’s leading banks may, of them-
selves, reduce German GDP growth by
1.9% next year.
• Euroland GDP growth forecasts for 1999
have dropped from 3.2% to under 2%. In
Italy the fall is from 2.5% to 1.6%. In
Germany and France growth is marked at
1.5% to 2%.
• The managed devaluation of the US
dollar, and corresponding rise in the DM,
exposes glaring unwillingness by euroland
central bankers to act upon these
recessionary facts. Market response to such
euroland stoicism has produced the stock
market ‘crashes’ in Frankfurt, Paris and
Milan.
• If the Growth & Stability Pact is adhered
to, borrowing next year will be restricted as
a result of lower GDP growth. Responding
to the social costs of deflation could trigger
massive ‘fines’, or further public spending
programmes will need to be cut.
Alternatively, more taxes must be imposed
on already depressed euro-economies.
• Such spending restrictions are already
being challenged by political leaders. The
prospect is being offered of euroland
economic and monetary policy being
targeted in opposing directions, with open
warfare developing between extravagant
politicians and the rigid mandate of the
central bank.
Such is the environment that some would
persuade us marks the birth of a stable
global currency!
The long term view
But suppose the euro survives this baptism
of fire: could it establish itself as a “safe
haven” currency in the longer term?
The eleven euro member countries’
economies are far from structurally, or even
cyclically, homogenous. In the absence of
convergence, the single interest and
exchange rate can never be the optimum
rate for most. The individual effect will be
either to restrict growth or encourage
inflation. But with a single ECB remit to
control inflation, the collective effect must
be towards lower growth.
Yet while the euroland economic zone
may be compared to that of the United
States the only way for its currency to
acquire similar status would be for the
region to surpass the US record for
sustained growth and creation of jobs. The
growing demands for Keynesian inter-
vention contrast with the successful liberal
policies of the United States and bode ill for
investor requirements of a low-inflationary
currency.
The further disincentives of high social
costs attached to euroland employment and
retirement, endemic restrictive regulatory
practices, and the increasingly crushing
weight of Commission regulations
deterring both labour and entrepreneurial
flexibility, must further count against
investor expectations of long-term euro-
land growth.
Demographics are not on
Euroland’s side
Furthermore, in its report in March this
year, the European Monetary Institute drew
dramatic attention to the long term
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economic effects of ageing populations now
afflicting many euroland countries.
In Italy, where official GDP growth
projections are predicated on continuous
budget surpluses, the EMI points out that
the marked ageing of the population –
reducing the workforce and increasing the
burden on unfunded state pensions – could
negate any such budget surpluses as a
proportion of GDP.
In Germany, it described the inescapable
consequences of the country’s ageing
population as set to place an increasing
strain on the economy, where the existing
burden of social levies were “already
unacceptably high.”
In terms of value, present unfunded state
pension liabilities in Germany, France and
Italy exceed 100% of GDP. This compares to
well under 20% in UK where a majority of
pensions are funded. The gaps in pension
contributions in Germany and France even
today amount to nearly 3.5% of GDP a year.
Borrowing to address this ever expanding
deficit in the future will require the
euroland interest rate to rise measurably;
alternatively greatly increased corporate
payroll taxes will need to be imposed. Either
choice must have serious consequences for
euroland’s future economic growth.
The growing debt burden
But the ‘pensions timebomb’ is just part,
though a central one, of euroland’s
destabilising future debt position. Despite
Maastricht requirements for euro entry of a
national debt limit of 60% of GDP:
Belgium’s current debt is 118%; Nether-
land’s debt is 70%; Italy’s debt is 118%;
According to the EMI this year, France’s
current fiscal position would “not appear to
be sufficient” to stabilise the ratio below 60
per cent. In Germany, despite the annual
deficit ratio “appearing” to fall last year, the
EMI believed this to be insufficient to cut
accumulated debt, “substantial progress in
consolidation of the fiscal position is
needed,” it said.
Yet these forecasts were made at a time of
expected up-turn for the euro economy; in
which the final reward for years of painful
stringency – creating unemployment levels
not seen in Europe for 50 years – was to be
the launch of the new euro currency at a
time coinciding with a cyclical upswing in
continental growth.
Euro reality
Now such dreams have been shattered. The
euro will be born at a time of financial crisis,
when talk is of ‘credit crunch’ and ‘global
meltdown’ in currency values. The euro
currency venture has always carried serious
risks: its concept is untried and it defies all
theory on optimal single currency area
economics. Now the contradictions within
the project that were clear from the start are
boiling over in tensions between regulatory
purists at the ECB and the growing fear
amongst Europe’s political elite that their
euro was designed for an economic era that
has now passed.
The authorities though, one can be sure,
will do all they can to maintain the euro’s
survival. And a common fiscal area for the
euro seems certain to be claimed as a first
necessity – to alleviate the unequal effects of
euro policy and to bolster its authority. EU
leaders may find themselves not only
struggling to establish confidence in their
hybrid currency in turbulent world
markets, but forcing through controversial
new political measures on common
taxation, raising further divisions amongst
EU members.
Will the euro offer a ‘safe haven’ in such
uncertain times? It would likely be many
years, and only following the establishment
of a truly political dimension to the
currency’s authority – namely, its own
sovereignty – that the euro might hope to
establish for itself the credibility of a safe
haven status to match the dollar. But as the
many unsolved problematic issues listed
above show, the naïvely-designed euro
currency area will almost certainly prove
unstable and therefore unsustainable (for
political as much as economic reasons) and
be forced apart before its grand ambitions
can ever be reached.
Germany’s debt is 61.2%; and France’s
national debt has been heading inexorably
upwards for the past eight years, from 36%
to 58% of GDP.
FACT
The UK’s trade deficit
over 25 years with the
EU exceeds £155
billion
… news in brief
Five wise men criticise Lafontaine
The five economists who advise the German Finance Minister have
issued sharp criticism of the new government’s economic policy.
Although the group thinks that the economic recovery in Germany has
stabilised despite the world’s financial crisis, it predicts only 2% growth
for 1999. Internal demand is predicted to fall next year and exports
are also expected to fall. Unemployment is predicted to remain above
4 million. The plans of the government leave much to be desired, the
group says. Above all, the economists have criticised Mr Lafontaine’s tax
plans, especially his failure to effect substantial cuts in income tax.
[Handelsblatt, 18th November 1998]
Mr Schröder goes to Moscow
The new German Chancellor has paid a visit to Moscow, having said
beforehand that he wanted “to put an end to the politics of the sauna” – a
reference to the close personal friendship between Helmut Kohl and
Boris Yeltsin. Accompanied by his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, the
Chancellor met the prime minister, Yevgueny Primakov, the presidential
hopeful, Alexander Lebed, and the General Secretary of the Communist
Party, Gennady Zyuganov. [Le Monde, 17th November 1998] Schröder
was quoted as having told Mr Primakov that Germany’s resources (for
helping Russia) were exhausted but that the Russian government’s
programme for dealing with the economic crisis was “a good start”.
[Handelsblatt, 17th November 1998]
It is noteworthy that Schröder wants to distance himself from the
chummy way in which Helmut Kohl used to conduct foreign policy.
Although he said that he wanted to make Germany “the advocate of
Russian interests”, it has also been noted by commentators that
Schröder believes that “people can have friends, but peoples have above
all interests”. [Handelsblatt, 18th November 1998]
Massimo d’Alema’s little red book
“It is practically impossible to find as beautiful a name as ‘Communist
Party’” [l’Espresso, 5th August 1990]; “It is clear to all that the Italian
Communist Party has made a decisive, democratic and majority choice
to change itself into the Democratic Party of the Left. And it decided to
do this without repudiating the history and the symbols of Italian
Communism” [L’Unita, 22nd April 1991]. These are both declarations by
the new “post” Communist prime minister of Italy, Massimo d’Alema.
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Moving On Up
Extracts from the European Foundation Pamphlet
The European Foundation pamphlet,Moving on Up analyses two issues:
· The current moves towards company and
savings tax harmonisation in the European
Union
· The effect of these developments on the
UK’s control of its tax policy, and so future
levels of UK tax.
High levels of foreign directinvestment in the UK, as a result of
low corporate taxation and an attractive
financial environment, already attract the
envy of other EU member states. In short,
tax harmonisation offers these states the
opportunity to end the UK’s self-made
advantage.
The Single Market gives the European
Court of Justice the means to, and EMU
will, end the UK’s autonomy in company tax
matters. One member of the influential
Ruding Committee which investigated
company taxation in the EU in 1992, noted
that “There was no doubt in the …
Committee that a common currency
requires at least minimum harmonisation
of direct taxation.” The result is that other
countries will increasingly be able to decide
Britain’s tax strategy especially if the UK
joins EMU. Any of EMU’s economic
benefits (no exchange rates, lower interest
rates) would be cancelled by the significant
increase in UK corporation tax to match the
continental average of 43.8% (weighted to
take account of population).
Whereas recent UK tax policy has
lightened the burden and encouraged
investment, continental taxes have risen (by
the EU’s own calculation, from 35% to 42%
of GDP 1981–95). Harmonisation of EU
member states’ tax rates would mean higher
taxes for the UK, since other states are
unable or unwilling to reduce the tax
burden on their voters and institutional
developments inside EMU would end the
need for unanimity among European
Union members over tax matters.
Tax harmonisation – in the news
Although not a new issue, taxharmonisation has suddenly hit the
news. The Austrians, who hold the EU
Presidency until January 1999, immediately
declared that harmonisation of corporation
tax was an important item on their agenda.
Several European countries, notably France,
Germany and Belgium have expressed
concerns that no action has been taken.
But late in 1997 the UK along with other
EU states, signed a code of conduct
pledging action on “harmful tax
competition”. The following day, Jean-
Claude Juncker, leader of the European
Parliament, announced that he expected the
harmonisation of EU business taxes “within
two years”.
In March 1998, the European Commis-
sion proposed a directive to standardise tax
on royalties and interest payments made
between related companies operating in
different member states.
By early summer, the Commission
announced plans for an EU-wide 20%
withholding tax on savings. This tax,
designed to ensure that all investments in
the EU are taxed, immediately attracted
criticism, with several banking associations
in the UK claiming that it would destroy the
profitable Eurobond market by driving
savers away from Europe in general and
London in particular. A delegation sent by
the City of London in November 1998 to
canvas opposition to the tax had no effect;
at the same time, the European Com-
mission approved a draft report which
advocated doubling the scope of the tax. In
particular, the tax seemed to blur the
significant distinction between illegal tax
evasion and legitimate tax avoidance, in line
with Article L of the 1997 code of conduct
which lumped evasion and avoidance
together. The code was especially significant
because it made these national legal con-
cepts a European political issue. On 26th
September, the Commission announced
that harmonisation of the withholding tax
on savings should be achieved by the end of
June 1999 at the latest. The recent ‘New
European Way’,  a document agreed by the
socialists in the EP, moved towards “co-
ordinating savings and corporate taxation”.
As we went to press, Mr Schröder made it
clear that he backed calls for an end to the
national veto on direct tax issues. It  became
clear that the German Government and the
French Government are both now calling
for the abolition of the veto and that the
Finnish Presidency next year expects to
call an IGC to amend the Treaty. The
European Foundation was, therefore, right
to predict calls to remove the veto six weeks
ago.
Direct tax harmonisation would initially
involve standardising company taxation
across the whole European Union. On Day
One of the Austrian Presidency, Austria’s
finance minister, Rudolf Edlinger, sum-
marised the issue simply: “If the EU
established minimum taxes, the countries
where the level is lower than that will have to
raise them. That is a problem.” (Electronic
Telegraph, 2nd July 1998) An effort to set an
EU business tax rate would constitute an
attempt to change the political philosophy
of many national governments, especially in
the UK.
Moreover tax levels reflect the ability of
governments to collect taxation: the vicious
circle of high taxation and a flourishing
black economy in several European
countries should be noted. A rate that
reflected other governments’ problems
would discriminate against British tax-
payers who have a good record of payment
of tax. Higher taxes would drive business
“Compulsory tax harmonisation is one of the most economically damaging ideas to come
out of Europe. It is portrayed as ensuring fairness between member state. In fact we are all
better off when governments are locked in competition, striving to be efficient so they can cut
taxes and attract business. Harmonisation would merely make Europe uncompetitive relative
to the rest of the world. Business is not going to stay here if it can get a better deal abroad. We
must seize every opportunity to expose the fallacies of the harmonisers. Moving On Up is a
valuable contribution to the debate.”
Richard Baron, Policy Unit, Institute of Directors.
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and investment out of Britain, especially in
financial services industry, where labour is
highly mobile. Heavier industry on the
continent would be less affected.
The story of VAT (indirect tax)
harmonisation reveals previous tactics used
by the Commission. Its publication, A
common system of VAT (XXI/1156/96, 24th
October 1996), insisted that ‘the
introduction of a single rate [of VAT]
should not be set aside since this would be
the only way of guaranteeing that the tax is
entirely neutral’. One sign that the
Commission fully intends to set a single rate
came when the status of its VAT Committee
abruptly changed from being ‘advisory’ to
‘regulatory’ on 21st January 1998.
It is unlikely that the VAT Committee will
settle on a low standard VAT rate as it suits
the European Commission to allow VAT to
increase since a large part of the EU budget
depends on VAT receipts, 42% of which go
to the EU. The larger the VAT receipt, the
more money the EU can spend
independently. Since the end customer pays
VAT, businesses have not opposed the
increase.
The impetus for direct tax
harmonisation
There are two major causes of tax
harmonisation:
· The European Court of Justice
· Economic and Monetary Union.
The European Court of Justice
Since the early 1980s the work of the
European Court of Justice [ECJ] has
crossed into the field of direct taxation in
supporting the freedoms of movement
within the European Communities. Its
activity has led KPMG’s David Evans and
Alastair Munro to conclude that “The
possible impact of European Community
law on United Kingdom direct taxation
cannot be underestimated.” (Taxation, 6th
August 1998) Professor Frans Vanistendael
of Leuven University explains the matter
simply:
“Increasingly the ECJ is applying the
non-discrimination principle, that has fully
been accepted and implemented in the area
of indirect taxation, to the area of income
tax. This is only a logical extension of the
basic principles on which the single market
is based in the EC Treaty. A single market in
which non-resident competitors from other
member states would be treated less











































































Corporation Tax across the EU
Income Tax across the EU
Base Rate Average Rate Higher Rate
(Average rate is shown where there is no single base rate)
Source: Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide
15
The European Journal • December 1998
JUMP TO CONTENTS
effect not a single market.” (EC Tax Review
1998/2 p.77)
The remit of the European Court of
Justice has increased for two reasons, in line
with its mandate to achieve the ‘ever closer
union’ of Europe. As the Single Market has
developed, to promote freedom of
movement, loop-holes have been revealed
in many EU member states’ tax laws. Article
234 of the Treaty on European Union
empowers the ECJ to judge these doubtful
cases in the first instance. The Court also
has jurisdiction in a final appeal (Article
K7). David Southern, a tax barrister writing
in Taxation, 16th October 1997, has
commented that “Effectively the European
Court of Justice has become a United
Kingdom tax court”, since the national
courts are unwilling to pass judgements that
might later be overturned by the ECJ.
The British Government has assured MPs
on numerous occasions that the unanimity
principle for matters of tax is ‘sacrosanct’
(the Prime Minister’s word) but the
evidence suggests otherwise. The European
Court of Justice has just used a Single Mar-
ket provision, Article 59 which prohibits
restrictions on freedom to provide services
in the EU, to attack Sweden’s insurance
company tax legislation (the Safir case,
judgement delivered on 28th April 1998).
Legislation on the Single Market requires
only simple majority, not unanimity. The
British Government is therefore wrong to
trumpet the power of its veto: the Single
Market has moved on, and now that varying
levels of tax are deemed to obstruct its
further development, the ECJ can apply
Single Market law to end distortions. Once
EMU starts, experts are agreed that a faster
decision-making process will be necessary.
This would involve majority voting on tax
issues. In 1997 the European Parliament’s
Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee called for majority voting on
tax matters three times. It noted that
“harmonisation … will ultimately render
the principle of unanimity superfluous.”
Economic and Monetary Union
Once EMU has begun, it will remove one
more barrier to international trade inside
the euro-zone: variable exchange rates. The
wide difference in corporation tax levels
around Europe will become more obvious
and there is likely to be political pressure
within the EU’s Council of finance
ministers to harmonise tax at a single
European rate so that no member of EMU
can profit from lower taxation.
Thus Onno Ruding, the former
Netherlands finance minister and now vice-
Chairman of Citicorp, explained in the
September 1998 issue of EC Tax Review that
“There are clear links between corporate
taxation, the EMU and the Single Market.”
He went on to say that “A successful EMU
requires a high degree of policy co-
ordination, on economic as well as political
matters, and will unavoidably reduce
remaining national autonomy, including on
tax policies. It is unrealistic to assume
differently.”
Will direct tax harmonisation push
British tax up?
Since EMU would lead to remote control of
British tax policy, if the UK joined, it is vital
to know to what level UK tax would be
harmonised. Some supporters of tax
harmonisation believe that it would lead to
lower tax, stimulating higher inward
investment. In theory tax could be
harmonised at any level, but the practical
situation in Europe means that the
benchmark is most likely to be higher rather
than lower than UK tax at present. The
benchmark could fall in one of three broad
areas.
· It could, if the UK joined EMU, reflect
Britain’s deregulated and low spending
policy on tax. This is recommended by
UNICE, Europe’s federation of employers.
UK tax would stay the same.
· It could find a middle way between the
bulk of higher taxing and spending con-
tinental economies and the British model.
UK tax would rise (by about 5 percentage
points).
· Alternatively it could reflect the Euro-
pean average. This is the easiest option. UK
tax would rise significantly (10–15
percentage points).
On the law of averages, it is unlikely that the
current rate of British corporation tax,
which is exceptional in Europe, would form
the benchmark. This mathematical
calculation is supported by investigation of
states’ political attitudes to the varying
corporation tax rates around the EU.
‘Harmful tax competition’
EU states have been preoccupied with the
issue of ‘harmful tax competition’ which has
been highlighted by EMU. Taxation deemed
‘harmful’, under a code of conduct
published late in 1997 and agreed by the
UK, concerns ‘those measures which affect,
or may affect in a significant way the
location of business activity in the
Community’ (Article A).
Also defined as harmful are ‘Tax
measures which provide for a significantly
lower effective level of taxation, including
zero taxation, than those levels which
generally apply in the member states in
question’ (Article B). Parliament debated
the code in late 1997, when questions were
raised about the exact definition of
‘harmful’. When an assessment of whether a
country’s system of tax is ‘harmful’ can be
initiated by another member state, as the
code allows, clearly whether Britain’s low tax
regime is deemed harmful depends on the
political opinion of other EU members. It is
a relative concept, as the German ex-finance
minister, Theo Waigel, showed when he
described London as a tax haven in late
1996, because low personal income tax in
the UK had encouraged German financiers
to move there.
Foreign Direct Investment
The UK benefits significantly from foreign
direct investment. According to the OECD,
in 1994 the UK received 34% of all inward
investment into the EU; corresponding
figures for France, Germany and Italy were
11%, 20% and 7% respectively.
One reason for the UK’s success seems to
lie in the significant difference between the
tax regime in the UK and that on the
continent. There is a close relationship
between low corporation tax and high levels
of investment, although the European
Commission has tried to separate the two. It
has claimed that varying tax rates obscure
the ‘intrinsic merits’ of various ‘investment
alternatives’ (Withholding tax proposal,
20th May 1998), when clearly the returns on
investment are inextricably linked to the
level of corporation tax. In October 1998,
the telecommunications company Ericsson
explained that its decision to move part of
its business to London followed difficulties
persuading executives to work in Sweden,
because of high taxes.
Tax havens
Tax havens in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle
of Man also encourage investors to deal
through London institutions with specific
expertise in the opportunities available.
These tax havens would fall foul of the Code
of Conduct, because Article M requires that
“Member States with dependent or
associated territories … commit themselves
… to ensuring that these principles are
applied in those territories.” The islands’
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future position is also precarious because of
the Commission is blurring the difference
between tax ‘evasion’ and ‘avoidance’.
‘Avoidance’ is defined in national terms as
the manipulation of tax law against
Parliament’s intent, yet clearly the code of
conduct and the aim to curb tax avoidance
and evasion give this legal issue an
international, political significance. It is
entirely possible, given the widespread
recognition of the need to attract foreign
direct investment, that other member states
will attack current British arrangements as
‘harmful’ or encouraging evasion or
avoidance, since they could be portrayed as
drawing investment away from other
European countries.
Why don’t other EU members lower
their taxes?
There are six major reasons why British tax
would rise because other EU states will
prove unwilling or unable to reduce their
tax rates.
· The Maastricht Treaty imposed
deflationary policies and many European
Union countries have no appetite for
further spending cuts, now that they have
qualified for EMU. Many experts, including
Adair Turner at the CBI fear that EMU may
increase unemployment, making welfare
cost-cutting less attractive to governments.
It would be easier to raise British tax, than to
reduce continental taxes.
· Many other countries would like a more
equal share of Foreign Direct Investment
without having to make the tax savings
Britain has. Few other countries have tax
havens like the Channel Islands: ironing out
the UK’s advantage would be attractive.
· The increasingly leftward slant of the
Social Democratic governments now
controlling the EU makes tax cuts unlikely.
Although deregulation and reform of the
welfare state are long overdue, governments
committed to old-style social protection are
unlikely to support a reform of tax
downwards. The Green Party/SPD coalition
in Germany has agreed to increase taxes on
energy as a means of financing growing
pension liabilities (FT, 19th October 1998).
The overall burden of tax, however, remains
the same.
· Large unfunded pension liabilities shared
by most European governments (but not
the UK) make continued higher taxes to
fund the mounting debt inevitable.
· The stability pact may also have an
unforeseen impact on tax as well, making it
imperative for governments to safeguard
tax levels to avoid contravening the pact,
which sets a maximum budget deficit for
EMU members, and being fined as a
consequence.
· Germany and France have already
implied that they could not tolerate the
British low tax regime inside EMU, as
continental business would migrate to the
UK. Already, some companies are taking
advantage of the Single Market’s Freedom
of Establishment provisions to register their
businesses in the UK – paying lower tax as a
result. This is bound to enflame opposition
to the UK’s fiscal regime, when other
governments lose tax revenue as a result.
The unspoken solution – lower
government spending
Both the Ruding (1992) and Monti (1996)
Reports to the Commission on taxation
identified what appeared to be an
intractable problem. Broadly, tax could
either be raised from mobile (business,
investment) areas of the economy, or
immobile bases (labour, land, housing). Tax
mobile elements and they leave, reducing
revenue. Tax the immobile, and the effect is
to reduce consumer spending and increase
unemployment. Tax competition was
identified in totally negative terms: it
‘eroded’ the tax base, was a ‘beggar thy
neighbour policy’ or ‘undermined’ govern-
ments. Neither report addressed the
possibility of reducing overall taxation.
Harmonisation would be an easy way to
pay for Europe’s pension liabilities, relying
on the size of the European market as a
means to guarantee continued investment
despite higher average taxation. If Britain’s
taxation were raised she would be paying
for a pensions problem she does not have.
However it is just as likely that higher taxes
would drive investment which might have
gone to the UK to other locations outside
the European Union.
Besides the threat to business, investment
and private savings, harmonising taxes
throughout the EU is profoundly undemo-
cratic. Today tax levels in Britain broadly
represent what the British electorate and
businesses in the UK are willing to pay. Yet
if UK tax increased due to cross-European
harmonisation, the government would be
powerless to do anything. voters would have
no ability to influence the level of tax they
pay.
At present the Government supports
joining EMU when the time is right. It also
supports international action to tackle tax
evasion. It maintains that the UK will
remain in full control of direct tax policy in
the UK. The mounting legal evidence
detailed above shows that the basis for the
last argument is very unsound. As Ruding
has made explicitly clear, “Monetary Union
requires … a willingness to reduce national
sovereignty over taxation as well.” The role
of the European Court of Justice and the
European Central Bank will make British
control over tax policy, and therefore low
British taxation, a thing of the past.
Joining EMU is central to the issue of tax
harmonisation since it would make the
British advantage transparently obvious.
Contrary to government claims, it would
also give Europe power to determine
Britain’s tax in its collective interest. It is
likely that the level of tax harmonisation
agreed by the Central Bank or in the Euro-
pean Council would cancel out any of the
marginal benefits EMU could offer the UK.
Tax harmonisation inside EMU would
mean a net deterioration in the attractive-
ness of the UK as a place to site business and
investment. British jobs and prosperity
would suffer as businesses and international
investment migrate elsewhere.
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Down which road?
Jason Groves reports that with the European Parliament on a spin doctored PR drive,
motor insurers cannot afford to take their eye off Brussels
The creeping tentacles of EUregulation does more than just change
the shape of British scotch bottles – it also
pervades the financial services industry.
Prescriptive regulations governing the
method of settling motor claims are
looming. While UK insurers are by and
large well prepared, the new red tape could
prove costly.
The Fourth Directive on the motor
insurance industry has been released by the
European Commission and has gone for
debate in the complicated structure that is
the EU way of governance. While increased
competition has been expected for some
time with the introduction of the euro, the
EU is developing processes it hopes will be
both consumer and insurer friendly. What
the new directive, anticipated to become EU
law by the end of 2001, will do is allow a
victim who has an accident in an EU
country in which they do not reside to gain
information about the offending vehicle
and pursue the claim in their home country
via the offending vehicle’s insurers agent in
that country. The victim will go to one of
the newly created information centres, in
either the country where the accident took
place or their own home country.
One proposal that could prove costly will
be the requirement to set up information
centres that carry full details of every
registered vehicle especially the name of the
vehicle’s insurer. The UK had already been
planning something similar through the
Motor Insurers’ Bureau with plans well
developed. The database will provide the
name of the vehicle’s insurer but problems
will arise in the case of fleet vehicles.
Insurers do not presently request regis-
tration details of all fleet cars but they may
well soon have to.
Parliament knows best
When asked how difficult this might be to
organise, Penny Coombs, manager-motor
for the Association of British Insurers (ABI)
said she hoped the final form of the
directive would not be that prescriptive and
was very optimistic that common sense
would prevail. Ms Coombs’ comments
followed her presentation at a recent con-
ference, where she said that while the
Parliament had a clear goal in mind, by
setting down exactly how it was to be
happens, the European Parliament’s current
thinking is that it knows best. Ideally, the
final form of the directive would not be
prescriptive enough to require information
centres to have full details, but rather only
require a speedy means for them to be
obtained. While the UK is not the only
country setting up a database – the Dutch,
for example, already have such a listing
already compiled – many EU member
countries will have much work to do.
According to Ms Coombs, proposals to
allow the victim to use the information
centre in any EU country are likely to be
rejected. The directive will, however, require
insurers to have agents in every EU member
country ready to handle any claims made
there. She added that the contact networks
for agents are already largely in place as a
result of the third directive dealing with
motor insurance services. Ms Coombs
thought it unlikely that insurance
companies would have to employ full-time
representatives, given the small number of
claims that are likely to be filed. She believed
that many companies would probably use
their links with other insurance companies
to act as their agents.
Don’t expect a speedy outcome
With Parliament determined to have claims
settled with a great deal of celerity, some
problems in communication are likely to
arise. The European Parliament, in a wish to
appear more pro-consumer, is likely to
apply additional pressure. The European
Council of Ministers will simultaneously
propose amendments. It will then be up to
the Commission to work with these two sets
of amendments, devise a workable outcome
and then return them to the two bodies.
Given the delay in meeting times for the
Council of Ministers responsible for the
final proposals, it is doubtful that any new
draft will appear within the next twelve
months. Insurance industry lobbyists are
hopeful of having a significant input into
any amendments that may go back for re-
consideration. Recent proposals, that could
have permitted the re-monopolisation of a
section of the car parts industry, were
deleted after heavy lobbying (from the ABI,
amongst others). Plans are also afoot to
examine the different levels of payout for
car insurance claims in EU countries.
Directives 1–3 cannot expect to escape a
broad sweep from the broom of review.
Other EU changes being foreshadowed
relate to the inevitable increase in compet-
ition that will accompany the introduction
of the euro in January. One initiative would
see buyers of motor insurance over the
telephone given a compulsory ‘cooling-off ’
period. The problems attendant on this
could be significant, especially if the
consumer expects immediate cover. A range
of issues – such as the short-term premium
to be charged if the customer decides
against continuing after the cooling-off
period – all need to be canvassed. Whilst
having to deal with the euro itself will prove
initially disconcerting, additional regu-
lation designed by the European Parliament
to be pro-consumer will have the ironic
effect of delaying any benefits, rather than
enhancing them.
The initial announcement made just over
a year ago was drawn up because a proposal
formulated by the EU-wide Council of
Bureaux working with the European
Insurance Committee failed to obtain
sufficient agreement to proceed. Having
taken so long to progress this far, final
resolution is still not near. What is certain is
that motor insurers will need to keep their
third eye on Brussels before they leap into
any pan-European gambit.
Jason Groves is Deputy Editor of Global
Insurance Monitor, published by Data-
monitor plc, where this article first appeared.
He was formerly on the staff of a minister in
the Australian government. He is also the
Convenor of the UK branch of Australians for
Constitutional Monarchy.
achieved, it was stifling the process. The
clear goal was to ensure that victims had
speedy access to information. Rather than
let the information centres devise the most
effective means of making sure this
… additional regulation
designed by the European
Parliament to be pro-consumer
will have the ironic effect of
delaying any benefits, rather
than enhancing them
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Why the Tories lost the 1997 British General Election
by Robert M. Worcester
Elections are ‘fought’ during‘campaigns’, with ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’,
‘battlebuses’ and ‘footsoldiers’. Every war
has its elements of strategy and tactics; no
less this last election. The Conservatives lost
the 1997 General Election at four strategic
points in the long campaign which began
soon after John Major’s stunning and
unexpected victory in 1992, long before the
tactics of the short campaign came into
play. Three were avoidable, the fourth
chance:
by taking sterling into the ERM at an
unsustainable exchange rate, the govern-
ment set in train a chain of events that
destroyed the Tories’ chance to benefit
politically from economic recovery;
by failing to call a referendum on the
Maastricht treaty, they lost the chance to
transfer responsibility for Europe from their
party to the people of Britain and thereby
side-step the divisions over Europe that tore
the party apart;
by keeping John Major as leader they lost
any opportunity to wipe the slate clean and
recast their image as they had done in 1990;
and by the sudden death of John Smith,
opening the way for Tony Blair’s election,
completing Labour’s renaissance as an
electable party, ensuring that voters could
run the risk of making the Tories pay for
their failings.
In fact, the 1997 British General Election
campaign itself, the ‘tactics’ if you will, as
opposed to the ‘strategy’, was ‘lost’ by
Labour: they shed votes throughout it,
mostly to the LibDems (the real ‘winners’)
while the Tories were making modest net
gains from returning waverers. But by then
it was far too late: an irrelevant battle won
when the war was already lost. Labour didn’t
need to hold all the support they had in
mid-March, they only needed to hold
enough to win, and they did so – to an
extent that far surpassed most expectations,
though a less inept Conservative campaign
might still have made the margin somewhat
closer.
The loss of the economic talisman
The first strategic error, even before the
1992 election, was entering the ERM at an
impossible exchange rate, led inevitably to
‘Black Wednesday’, 16 September 1992.
This humiliation, just five months into the
parliament, damaged any chance the
government might have had of claiming
credit for economic recovery.
The Conservatives persisted in assuming
that achieving a strong economy –
economic determinism – was the trump
card that would swing the votes to them and
prove the polls wrong. Led by Michael
Heseltine, many expected, or so they said,
that a grateful British public would reward
them for their cautious, and successful,
management of the economy. “When, did
the British voting not follow economic
optimism?” they asked; 1 May 1997 was the
answer.
MORI measures the EOI or Economic
Optimism Index (‘consumer confidence’ or
‘feel-good factor’) monthly. EOI had risen
sharply in the last few months before each
election since the Tories came to power, and
this encouraged them to think that the
economy had the potential to help them
again, if they could harness their fortunes to
it. In most past elections a rise in the EOI
tended to go with a rise in the Government’s
popularity in the opinion polls, and vice-
versa; in statistical terms, there was a high
correlation between the two variables.
In the six months preceding the 1997
election, by contrast, there was a nil
correlation. In the event, as in past elections
the EOI did rise: from -9 in December 1996
to +13 the weekend before the election,
peaking at +28 (a record) a fortnight after
Labour’s victory. But it didn’t help the Tories
at the polls; other factors pertained.
Divisions over Europe
Next came the refusal of a referendum over
Maastricht. If the Prime Minister, Chancel-
lor and Foreign Secretary had transferred
responsibility for the decision to sign
Maastricht from themselves to the people,
they could have avoided the awful divisions
that tore the Tory Party apart. Time after
time I argued they should. John Major said
he couldn’t get it through the Cabinet.
Canny Ken asked “How do you know we’d
win?” Douglas Hurd wrote to me to say that
to consult the public in a referendum was
‘not done’.
We regularly measure the public’s per-
ception of party image, asking them which
of a list of descriptions (some positive, some
negative) fit their impressions of each party.
Survey by survey from the late eighties the
Conservatives lost their positive attributes
and hardened the perception the public had
of the negatives, until only the negatives
were left. Perhaps most damagingly, by 1997
two-thirds of the public identified the Con-
servatives as ‘divided’ . Divided parties don’t
win British elections. In addition, of course,
they became tagged as the Party of sleaze,
and managed to strengthen both impres-
sions further during the election campaign
itself.
Yet Europe in itself was not an election
winning or losing issue: it simply wasn’t
important enough to enough voters. When
we asked which issues from a list electors
thought would be very important in
deciding which party to vote for, more than
two-thirds picked ‘health care’ and three in
five ‘education’; fewer than a quarter said
Europe would be very important, and of
them only two in five thought the Tories had
the best policies on Europe.
In fact, the Tory image on Europe was so
ambivalent that it could hardly have helped
them even if it had been higher on the
agenda. A recent article by Geoffrey Evans
in the British Journal of Political Science,
analysing data from the British Election
Panel Study on perceptions of the parties in
1996, showed that people who perceived the
Conservatives as anti-European tended to
themselves be pro-European, while those
who perceived the party to be pro-
European were more likely to be anti-
European. (Neither of the other parties had
the same handicap.) The divisions on
Europe had not simply made it harder to
exploit the issue but had actually turned it
into a more dangerous one.
The leadership
The third strategic error was in not
replacing John Major as leader when he gave
them the chance, by voluntarily initiating a
leadership contest.
In the Spring of 1990 the Conservative
Party lagged the Labour Party by 23% in the
polls. What did they do? They changed their
leader, Margaret Thatcher for John Major,
they changed their policies, especially by
dropping the hated poll tax, they changed a
third of their Cabinet, and they changed the
Party Chairman. In 1992 they won the
General Election, albeit by such a narrow
margin that if one person in two hundred
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who voted Tory had voted for the second
party in their constituency, it would have
been a hung Parliament.
In the Spring of 1994, the Conservatives
lagged the Labour Party in the polls by 22%.
What did they do? They kept their Leader,
they kept their policies, they kept their
Cabinet. They changed the Party Chairman,
twice, and got it wrong both times.
Throughout this period the Prime Minister
complacently stressed the improving
economic situation and his confidence that
once the British public were aware that
inflation was down, unemployment was
falling and the economic management by
his Government was sound, that the public
would return them, gratefully, to office for
an unprecedented fifth term. The senior
members of the Government repeatedly
ignored the worsening political poll
findings, repeating how they’d proved the
polls wrong in 1992, and they’d do it again.
Heseltine’s cry: “We’ll win by 60.”
We also regularly measure leader image.
John Major came into Downing Street in
November 1990, and the country was
involved immediately in the Gulf War. By
the following February, Major was seen as
‘capable’, ‘good in a crisis’ and ‘has sound
judgement’. But over time he became much
like Mrs Thatcher in trousers, except that he
was thought neither ‘capable’ nor ‘good in a
crisis’. His image became fixed in the minds
of the electorate: John Major was perceived
as a ‘nice guy’, but electorally he had become
a liability.
Furthermore, the campaigns run by
Central Office and the men he appointed
Chairman, Jeremy Hanley and Brian
Mawhinney, were disastrously unsuccessful.
Their advertising was counter-productive,
they focused attention on the wrong policy
issues, and their final attempt to seize the
initiative at a key moment of opportunity
consisted of sending out a man dressed in a
chicken suit to peck at the heels of Tony
Blair.
I have a theory about the most notorious
of the ads. At one of the Prime Minister’s
regular Sunday evening meetings with his
advertising and PR gurus, Lords Saatchi and
Chadlington, and (Sir) Tim Bell. The PM
was saying that “If we don’t get Europe off
the agenda, we’re dead!” Maurice Saatchi
replied: “Well Prime Minister, we’ve been
thinking…”, and pulled out a mock up of
the ad that was to become ‘Satanic Eyes’.
Was it worth it? The evidence suggests
not. The campaign ran for just one day, in
three papers, and on the hoardings, but
received enormous media coverage. Shortly
afterwards, we asked the public “Has the
Conservative Party’s poster campaign
showing Tony Blair with ‘satanic eyes’ made
you less likely to vote Labour (sic) at the
next general election, more likely to vote
Labour (sic) at the next general election, or
has it made no difference?”, 11% said it
made them more likely, 3% less likely, and
75% said it made no difference (11:3).
Among ex-Conservative voters the ratio
was 18:4; among new Labour switchers,
11:2. When ‘New Labour, New Danger’ was
resurrected in January 1997, we asked the
public’s view again, with results even less
favourable to the Conservatives.
Central Office might have found this out
for themselves, of course, before running
the ads, but M&C Saatchi refused to pre-test
their material in the normal way with focus
groups.
Floundering in the swamp of sleaze
By the time the Prime Minister called the
election it was already too late to win, but a
competent campaign might have limited
the damage; but the tactical phase proved as
unrewarding as the strategic phase had
been. Mr Major hoped to launch the
election surfing the good economic news
and the announcement of reduced
unemployment rates. Little did he know
that his first two weeks were to be swamped
in sleaze.
Nothing that the Tories could do, would
get the media’s attention back onto the
policy issues of the election. It well suited
Labour to continue the focus on sleaze, for
they were characterised by only a third of
the electorate as ‘sleazy’, while two-thirds
so described the Conservatives. The
Mandelson machine was of course helped
by the early declaration of the Sun for
Labour, as vitriolic against the Tories in
1997 as it had been vicious in their favour
in 1992. The Sun is read by nearly one in
five voters.
The focus of the Tories’ election
campaign, too, was badly misconceived. We
had been tracking the relative salience to the
public of 16 possible issues, asking which
would be ‘very important’ in influencing
their votes. It was soon apparent that the
‘four horsemen’ of the election would be
health care, education, unemployment and
law & order. That’s what Labour spokesmen
concentrated on, right from the beginning
when they were the chosen themes of the
‘Road to the Manifesto’, at their press
conferences, in their leader’s speeches, and
even the ‘pledge cards’ which they handed
out to the nation.
Meanwhile the Prime Minister spent the
third week talking about constitutional
threats of Labour’s policies and especially
devolution. Out of 16 issues, ‘constitutional
issues/devolution’ ranked 16th in impor-
tance with the voters, and the issue that the
Deputy Prime Minister spent most of the
same week talking about, trade unions,
ranked 15th out of 16.
New Labour, No Danger
Going hand in hand with Tory decline was
Labour recovery, driven by the election of
Tony Blair. This had two principal
consequences. When the electorate looked
at Neil Kinnock they saw over one shoulder
the spectre of the loony left, CND, and tax
and spend; over the other, the spectre of the
trade union barons. There was a trace of
those ghosts over John Smith’s shoulders as
well. And while Kinnock had had Peter
Mandelson by his side, Smith had him
banished from the court. When you looked
at Tony Blair, there were no ghosts, and
Mandelson was back, to chair the most
effective campaign in Labour’s history.
By the time the strategic phase was played
out, the election called and the short-term
tactics of the campaign itself begun, the
election was already effectively lost. Had the
referendum on Maastricht been held, it
would not have saved the Tories from defeat.
But it could have saved the humiliation of a
179 Labour majority.
Robert M. Worcester is Chairman of MORI
and Visiting Professor of Government at LSE.
This article is extracted from a book by
Worcester and Mortimore (forthcoming).
With reference to the section ‘Divisions over
Europe’: The predictions of the Maastricht
rebels have been proved beyond doubt. In the
last 18 months, readers will recall a) the
Sheffield Nottingham Study, which showed
that 60% of Tory MPs who voted for
Maastricht were privately against it; and b)
the recent Nottingham Trent Survey which
showed that 67% of current Tory MPs
privately say ‘Never’ to a single currency.
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The Retreat of the State in International Affairs
Extracts from a speech by The Rt Hon. the Lord Owen, CH, delivered on 21 October 1998,
in Norwich Cathedral, as part of the Launcelot Fleming Lecture Series ’98
The most significant attempt to dilutenational sovereignty in the area of
collective defence started after the end of
the First World War in the negotiations over
the Covenant to establish the League of
Nations. In 1919 most people in Europe
were ready to accept the leadership of
President Woodrow Wilson at the Peace
Conference in Paris. It was agreed early on
in Paris that America’s Monroe Doctrine,
guaranteeing US supremacy in Latin
America, was to remain exempt from the
Covenant. The controversy back in the
United States came from Article X, the
commitment to “preserve against external
aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all
members of the League”. This left Wilson
wide open to the jibe from Theodore
Roosevelt, the former President, who was
himself not shy about using America’s
weight overseas, that “every time a Yugoslav
wishes to slap a Czechoslovak in the face” it
would mean that President Wilson would go
to war. Wilson thought that the Senate
would never dare to reject the whole
elaborate structure of the Treaties of Paris.
But on the 19th November 1919 the Senate
voted against. A second vote on the 19th
March 1920 also failed to pass. Few events
illustrate better the separation of powers in
the US constitution and the limitations of
Presidential power as the United States’
refusal to join the League of Nations.
American reluctance to be involved once
more on the continent of Europe was shown
again on the 3rd of September 1939 when
Britain’s ultimatum to German to suspend
their attack on Poland expired. While
Britain and France declared war, President
Franklin Roosevelt coincidentally made a
proclamation of neutrality similar to that
made by President Wilson in 1914. The
evacuation from the beaches of Dunkirk in
June 1940 and the RAF’s Battle of Britain in
August 1940 began to tilt the balance of
public opinion about the war in Europe in
the United States. But there was still no
majority sentiment to become involved.
Roosevelt was re-elected on the 5th of
November 1940. In January 1941 he
introduced the Lend-Lease Bill, for financial
loans to Britain, to Congress. After an
acrimonious debate, the Bill was eventually
pushed through on the 11th March 1941.
Churchill later described the Lend-Lease
Bill in his war memoirs as “the most
unsordid act in the history of any nation”.
Its generosity was surpassed only by the
post-war Marshall Plan.
On 7th December 1941, after 366
Japanese war planes had launched a
surprise attack on the US Pacific fleet in
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, America declared war
on Japan. It was, however, Germany on 11th
December which declared war on the
United States which was still neutral in
Europe. Churchill’s biographer, Martin
Gilbert, described Hitler’s decision as
“perhaps the greatest error, and certainly
the single most decisive act, of the Second
World War”. For it brought the United States
back to Europe as a belligerent.
With war over in 1945 the US started to
move their forces back home. They also
initially took a rather favourable view of
Stalin though disillusionment soon set in.
The American people were, however, ready
to allow President Harry Truman, with
bipartisan support in Congress, to play the
key role in the San Francisco Conference in
1945 which established the United Nations.
Truman, who had fought in Europe in 1918,
carried in his wallet all his life Tennyson’s
dream, the last two lines being:
Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer
and the battle flags were furled
In the Parliament of Man,
the Federation of the World.
Winston Churchill called those words the
most wonderful of prophecies and his
famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in 1946 was
devoted to extolling the merits of the United
Nations.
In December 1946 the Greek Govern-
ment was losing its civil war in the north
against the Greek communists who were
operating from mountain strongholds in
communist Albania, Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia. British aid was drying up and on 21
February 1947 Britain, in deep financial
trouble, told the US it would have to stop
financial aid to Greece and Turkey by the
end of March.
On 12 March the Truman Doctrine was
set out in a speech to a joint session of
Congress, establishing one of the primary
objectives of American policy as, “the
creation of conditions in which we and
other nations will be able to work out a way
of life free of coercion”. Truman went on to
say, “should we fail to add Greece and
Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be
far reaching to the West as well as to the
East.”
American public opinion now accepted,
after losing their own men in two wars
fought outside their own territory, that they
were no able to insulate their country from
world problems. Isolationism gave no
protection and furthermore even they
needed allies to assure victory. Congres-
sional opinion in 1948 was ready to support
the establishment of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation which carried a
permanent commitment to the defence of
Europe, something they could not accept in
1920.
A nation, whether democratic or not,
has as one of its most distinctive features a
readiness to fight to defend its territory
when under attack. The most profound
decision in a democracy is that which
politicians take to send their nation’s
children, often including their own, off to
war. That is one reason why democracies are
said to be slow to fight. After the wanton
sacrifice of the First World War, Wilfred
Owen and other poets have made us
establish a new language for war. Today very
few would claim “dulce et decorum est pro
patria mori”. Nonetheless, when the threat
is real a duty of collective self responsibility
asserts itself. A mutual identity, a sense of
collective self regard and self responsibility
is the hallmark of a nation. A multinational
state can best build those characteristics
within a democratic framework, but it is
harder to achieve and sometimes founders
where there are internal ethnic divisions.
The character and unity of a nation
depends a great deal on how it retains an
identity.
No wise political leader will dare take the
collective will to fight for granted or lightly
invoke it. The best protection against the
irresponsible sacrifice of the nation’s young
is that in a democracy the wrath of the
family will be visited through the ballot box
on politicians who do act irresponsibly.
In any analysis of what can be sound and
sensible retreats in the power of the state in
international affairs, one needs to be sure
that nothing is done which damages the
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basic instinct for self preservation, nor
erodes the collective will to fight in one’s
own national self defence. Also one needs to
consider whether a retreat in the power of
the state deepens, or weakens, the demo-
cratic way of life of the nation, democracy
of itself makes a massive contribution to the
collective will to defend what one respects
and identifies with. Democracy is the
system whereby individuals can best relate
to the national interest, for it is far easier to
act unselfishly and accept constraints if
there is a system of governance premised on
strict accountability to freely arrived at
majority opinion.
The European Union in its development
so far represents a unique attempt to marry
the strengths of individual nationhood with
the strengths of nations combining
together. The founding fathers and some of
the politicians at the time of the Messina
Conference, which established the Treaty of
Rome, did envisage that the commitment to
an ever greater unity would inexorably lead
to a nation called Europe developing in the
fullness of time. But they avoided spelling
that out in treaty form. A pragmatic step by
step approach to the evolution of the future
has governed all subsequent treaties. As a
direct consequence of this there is a
calculated ambivalence as to whether we are
creating a Union of European nation states
or a United States of Europe. It is as
legitimate to argue that the EU’s destiny is to
remain a union with limits to the retreat
from nationhood as it is to argue that the
EU’s destiny is to continue the retreat until it
is a United States of Europe. It is a travesty to
say, however, that those who argue for limits
are Eurosceptics. I am not a Eurosceptic
but an enthusiastic supporter of building a
consensus on as many issues as possible
with our nearest neighbours in Europe. I
defy anyone to challenge my political
record as a convinced champion of the EU.
But I am just as proud to fight within the EU
to retain the sinews of British nationhood
and to set limits on the retreat of our state. I
look to the politicians in the House of
Commons today to have the self-confidence
to use the veto powers contained within the
treaties to block retreats that erode the
essentials of our national identity. That is
one of the main reasons that I supported the
Maastricht Treaty because it does set limits
on the retreat of the state.
In 1956 the United Kingdom chose, with
few dissenters, not to participate in the
creation of what was initially the Common
Market. Geography dictated we stayed
the two politicians of their time who, by
nature, dissembled least faced up to the
unresolved issue of federalism with honesty.
Hugh Gaitskell, then leader of the Labour
Party, replying to Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan’s television broadcast, asked if
Macmillan wanted to enter a European
Federation. If so it “means the end of Britain
as an independent nation; we become no
more than ‘Texas’ or ‘California’ to the
United State of Europe”. Jo Grimond, then
leader of the Liberal Party, put the contrary
view, saying that if we were going to “control
the running of Europe democratically,
you’ve got to move towards some form of
federalism and if anyone says different to
that they are misleading the public”. Would
that many of the politicians who came after
had had the same honesty. In what I once
called the politics of ‘fudge and mudge’, it
has become an art form in the UK to
obfuscate. Too many politicians deny the
pressures within the Brussels bureaucracy
to undermine the nation state. Before the
Maastricht Treaty signatures were dry,
many continental politicians were trying to
erode the three intergovernmental pillars
which they had only reluctantly accepted.
To say this is not to be paranoid or to believe
in conspiracy theories. To their credit on the
continent most politicians are quite open
about their federalist intentions.
On the single currency the British and
Danish opt-out in the Maastricht Treaty
reflected in the main a number of differ-
ences of view. Firstly, whether it was possible
to run a single currency successfully across
eleven national boundaries without inevit-
ably moving towards single economic and
fiscal policies. Also there was a concern that
these economic and fiscal decisions would
not be made democratically without a
federalist structure. A single currency
across national boundaries involves a
fundamental political change of direction
for the UK and it is right that this should be
made outside the confines of party politics
and requires a referendum. The onus of
proof has been placed on those who want to
give up the pound to show real benefits if
such a referendum is ever called. The
implication of a single currency for the
security and foreign policy intergovern-
mental pillars is something which I will
concentrate on in this lecture leaving the
economic and fiscal questions to one side.
I am certain that majority voting
designed to produce a single, as distinct
from a common, foreign and security policy
is an absolute Rubicon for a nation state.
Cross it and you have given up your
nationhood even though some politicians
will not admit this. As to a single currency
my deep suspicion is that, though in my
judgement it is not a Rubicon, for those
countries who take it it will prove to be a
threshold decision. A decision on a slippery
slope where, unless the foreign and security
intergovernmental pillar is reinforced, the
slide will be towards a United States of
Europe. The nature of the economic and
fiscal decisions necessary for convergence
will drive those who choose to live in
Euroland to develop most of the
characteristics of a nation called Europe
and in that process they will be even more
relaxed than they are at present about
introduced qualified majority voting in the
framework of a CFSP.
Some people argue that there is no danger
of the foreign and security intergovern-
mental pillar eroding in Euroland, But it is
not hard to see how this erosion would
happen. In the Maastricht Treaty there is a
potentially far reaching provision for
declaring an area of foreign policy to be the
subject of joint action. This decision has,
however, to be taken unanimously but
thereafter the implementing decisions are to
be taken by qualified majority voting. The
mechanism was wished on the UK at
Maastricht by those who saw this
mechanism as the thin end of a potentially
very long wedge. The temptation to invoke
joint action will come at a time when the
outside the Coal and Steel Community
which did so much to bring the great
industries of France and Germany together
across their national boundaries. History
stopped us from being active at the Messina
Conference. In 1962 the UK did, however,
embark on a genuine debate about whether
we should join the Common Market and
 I look to the
politicians in the
House of Commons
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UK has a very strong foreign policy
objective and wants the EU to support it. It
is not hard to imagine others in the EU
suggesting that this policy should only be
adopted if it is to be subject to joint action. It
only then requires a Foreign Secretary who
either believes in Euroland or is too ready to
accept the advice of a Foreign Office often
eager to go along with the European
consensus and have difficulty with ever
exercising a veto and the UK will have
crossed the all important threshold,
qualified majority voting in foreign policy. I
have no doubt that the UK should never
under any circumstances, however
tempting, cross that threshold.
Any EU nation needs to have an inner self
confidence to step out of an otherwise EU
consensus position on foreign and defence
policy. There can be no doubt that a country
whose currency is part of the euro will be
under additional pressures to avoid the
tough choices of following an independent
foreign policy line that carries risks of trade
embargoes or economic discrimination. For
one simple reason, retaliation on a partici-
pating member in the single currency will
no longer affect only that country but all
participants. It can be argued, therefore, and
sometimes is, that countries operating
within a monetary union have more eco-
nomic protection to take a robust foreign
policy line. Yet EU experience shows that
what is more likely to develop is a soft CFSP
designed to keep policy within the middle
of the euro pack. Something which we have
seen all too recently over Kosovo. One does
not need to invoke British foreign policy
over the last one thousand years. One only
has to recall, with the exception of France,
the continental European equivocation over
nuclear weapons while we were still
confronting the Soviet Union in the 1970s
and 1980s to know why we should refuse to
lose our independence in foreign and
defence policy. While French also know this
to be true and are sympathetic to British
fears, in the last analysis they believe that
Germany will always support France out of
solidarity if French vital interests are at
stake. Britain has no such bilateral buttress.
Some in Britain dream of joining the
Franco–German Alliance. It is now said that
because of the SPD victory in Germany we
will be able to develop a trilateral relation-
ship with France and Germany to match the
bilateral Franco–German relationship. Yet
Oscar Lafontaine comes from the Saarland
and is very close to France in all respects.
Gerhard Schroeder is more sympathetic but
will find the German bureaucracy totally set
on the primacy of the Franco–German
Alliance. Whitehall is now beginning to
adjust the language and talk of a
quadrilateral relationship including Italy,
but this will cause even more resentment
across the EU.
The wise decision of Tony Blair as Prime
Minister to put the onus in a referendum on
demonstrating concrete benefits means that
the proponents, instead of talking about
‘missing the train’, or failing to ‘catch the
bus’ or building up a vague belief that
joining the euro is inevitable, will have to
answer hard questions of national interest.
Also the new proposals from the Neill
Committee on Standards in Public Life
mean that there will be rules in place on the
fair conduct of any referendum. Personally I
eschew fixing any timetables. I hope we
never have to be part of a single currency
and only if the economic disadvantages that
I foresee prove to be unjustified and the
political ramifications are less than I fear
would I be prepared to contemplate it.
Prudence would dictate first seeing how
countries whose economies are not con-
verging with the majority within the euro
weather an economic downturn without the
capacity to devalue their currency, or to
alter their interest rates. Also how such
countries ease rising unemployment with-
out the migration possibilities to other EU
countries that, for example, a worker in the
US east coast rust belt has to enable them to
move down south or out west. Also to just
the effect on unemployment of not having
the fiscal transfers between the countries of
Europe that exists between the prosperous
and rich states in the US. Waiting and seeing
means judging that it will not be sufficient
for those politicians who want to join to
mouth bland generalities about political
will and the need not to be left behind in
Europe.
Summary of the Maastricht Treaty Provisions on CFSP
The objectives of the common and
foreign security policy shall be:
• to safeguard the common values,
fundamental interests and inde-
pendence of the union;
• to strengthen the security of the
union and its member states in all
ways;
• to preserve peace and strengthen
international security, in accord-
ance with the principles of the UN
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act,
and the objectives of the Paris
Charter;
• to develop and consolidate
democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights
The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the
foreign and security policy is that:
• the council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from
the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint
action. Whenever the council decides on the principle of joint
action it shall lay down specific scope, the union’s general and
specific objectives in carrying out such actions, if necessary its
duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its
implementation.
• the council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any
stage during its developments , define those matters on which
decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the
council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the
preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be
weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the treaty
establishing the European Community, and for their adoption,
acts of the council shall require at least 54 votes in favour, cast by
at least eight members.
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Not joining the euro is in no way
comparable to staying away from the
Messina Conference which set up the
Common Market in 1956. We are today full
members of the EU, we have helped shape
the European Monetary Union for those
countries who want to join. We are entitled
to join the single currency if we wish at any
time after fulfilling the criteria within the
Maastricht Treaty. There cannot be any veto
from another EU country on our joining.
Like over the ERM we participated in the
EMS and kept our options open to join as
and when we wished. We do not need to use
a veto, all we need is self-confidence and the
will to exploit the euro to our commercial
benefit as we have done for the dollar and
the yen.
We do need to watch carefully how other
countries behave on all aspects of the EU’s
political development. In that sense we will
be better able to assess the political impact
of monetary union and the certainty of our
being able to continue to pursue an
independent foreign policy after the
passage of the years. Our political leaders
need the confidence to wait and see and not
be carried away by an illusion that
leadership is always about action. Some of
the best leaders are those who understand
the power of patience. Claims to leadership
in Europe usually turn out to be transient or
illusory. We best lead on the many issues
where the US policy is a major factor, not
because we have an exclusive relationship
with the US but because of a national
affinity on most, but not all, issues.
We must also not feel too threatened by
loose talk that our place in the G7 will be
put in jeopardy if we are not part of the
single currency. Canada will not exactly
give up G7 participation. Nor would I be
that confident that Germany, France and
Italy, when the single currency is operating,
will agree to be represented by the President
of the European Bank or one Prime
Minister. Unless, of course, they appoint or
elect, as many wish, a Euroland Cabinet
with a President and Finance Minister.
Russia has only just secured their G8
position and their power will slowly recover.
If an informal G3 of the dollar, yen and
euro develops, so be it. We have lived in the
UK with the reality for some years where the
Deutschmark has given the German
Bundesbank and German Government a
stronger role on international monetary
matters than the UK. Nevertheless an inde-
pendent Governor of the Bank of England
operating a successful economy with a
strong pound will find a welcome in most
monetary forums and a British Prime
Minister’s political influence in G8 will
continue to have real value.
Britain does not have to stay in a bunker
while exercising its euro opt-out. Instead it
should champion and develop further the
common, not single, foreign and security
intergovernmental pillar. We can demon-
strate that in this area we are not negative
but positive reformers, ready to become a
key player within the EU. We should talk
intensively with the French and I suspect we
can both learn from the dialogue over what
was called the Fouchet Plan even though it
was held in 1962. The Plan failed because of
a dispute over limiting the supranationality
of a ‘Union of States’. Now such a debate will
in some matters be easier for the parameters
of the EU are much better defined. France
wants Britain to be more forthcoming
over European defence. Britain’s defence
partnership on the ground with France
from 1992 onwards in Bosnia, as I witnessed
at close quarters, has left both armed forces
with considerable mutual respect. The far
closer working relationship between the
FCO and the Quai d’Orsay established in
1991 with the break up of Yugoslavia has
meant that the old scars from the failed
collaboration over Suez in 1956 have largely
healed. Paris has noted with both surprise
and appreciation the readiness of London
to seriously differ at times with the Wash-
ington line over Yugoslavia. It is essential for
Britain that we build on this relationship
with France, which should not be in any way
based on downplaying the US or diminish-
ing Germany, let alone being antagonistic to
NATO. It is in our interest to ensure that the
intergovernmental pillar supporting CFSP
is bedded into the practice and future
development of the EU. A wise British
government would quietly let our European
friends know that this needs to be done
before the UK will every seriously contem-
plate participating in the single currency.
It will be the generation of people
untouched by the Cold War who will decide
the limits to the UK’s future role within the
European Union and the extent of any
further retreats. We who lived through the
most testing period of deterrence and
detente confronting the Soviet Union have a
duty as far as possible to ensure that the
younger generation make their decision in
the full possession of all the facts, against
the background of a UK that has rebuilt a
strong economic base and has redeveloped
a broad, confident, global outlook.
Mr Blair’s European Army
by Keith Simpson, MP
In October we witnessed a classicexample of Blairite style over substance.
A Blairite proposal spun outside Parliament
and in advance of a European summit, a
hint of a new policy initiative, which, under
scrutiny became a will-o’-the-wisp that left
his own ministers confused and our allies
disappointed. I refer to the strange case of
Mr Blair’s apparent conversion to a defence
role for the European Union, trailed before
the EU summit in Austria. Mr Blair
appeared to suggest that Britain was
prepared to concede a defence role to the
European Union, to see the eventual
scrapping of the Western European Union,
and the creation of some kind of new
structures whereby troops from different
European countries could act together in
either peacekeeping or combat roles.
In the same breath Mr Blair denied that
he was seeking to undermine NATO or
create a European Army or have the Euro-
pean Commission undertake a security
role. Mr Blair’s briefings to the press took
place on the second day of Parliament’s
debate on the Strategic Defence Review
when his ministers were claiming solid
support for NATO and a limited role for the
WEU. When the Conservatives sought
clarification of the government’s position
through an adjournment debate on the
European Union (Defence Policy) on 11th
November we were left none the wiser. To
say the very least it has left many defence
experts puzzled and many politicians with a
sneaking suspicion that Mr Blair is trying to
move Britain closer to some of its European
partners on the question of a truly
European defence identity. But given his
own government’s officially stated position
at Amsterdam, the deep suspicion within
the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence,
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and the sharp reaction by the Conservatives
this is a change of policy that “dares not
speak its name.”
Of course New Labour deals in
counterfeit briefings, double entendre and
kite flying as a substitute for policy. A recent
report by the think-tank Demos has
proposed the idea of a single ‘European
Army’, something which has been floated
amongst a number of European think tanks
over the years, but to date has found very
little support in Britain. But perhaps now is
the time, amongst the contradictory
rhetoric of New Labour defence thinking, to
look at the viability of a ‘European Army’.
Let me say at the outset that a ‘European
Army’ is not an impossibility – given
political will, political and structural fusion
and a real identity of interests and values it
could be created – but the ‘given’ is quite an
assumption. The concept of a ‘European
Army’ is not new. It was first (out of fairness
I have excluded Hitler’s concept of creating
a European Army to fight Bolshevism after
1943) seriously considered fifty years ago as
part of the movement to create a European
Defence Community. Every now and again
since then it has been taken out and dusted
down either as a vague concept for the
Europeans to pull their weight in NATO or
as a stalking horse by the French who resent
what they see as the US domination of
NATO and hence of Europe.
A truly ‘European Army’ cannot be
created without creating a real European
Union with integrated sovereignty and co-
ordination of policy and one political voice.
There are Euro-federalists who seriously
want to achieve that political union, but
such a concept is not achievable in anything
like a short time scale. And for those British
critics who firmly place France in that
unionist role there are some fascinating
contradictions of Gallic behaviour. I believe
that France wants the US to be more of an
associate in Europe than a serious political
player, and sees any European Union
dominated by French interests and political
structures. It is interesting that in the
current debate within the UN over the
restructuring of the Security Council, the
French are in favour of expanding the
permanent membership by including
Germany and Japan but appear
uninterested in a single EU representative
which would inevitably lead to the
exclusion of Britain and France.
To create a real ‘European Army’ would
ultimately mean a complete loss of national
sovereignty and an inability to use national
defence assets for national interests. At
present the European members of NATO –
let alone of the WEU or OSCE – have
considerable differences in foreign and
security policy objectives, in the organis-
ation and effectiveness of their armed
forces, and in their national ability to
project power beyond their own frontiers.
Amongst the European members of
NATO only Britain and France have the
traditions, will power and capability for real
force projection and sustainability. Other
European countries in varying degrees –
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany – can
participate on a limited liability, whilst
others are useful at the political flag waving
end of the support spectrum.
If the objectives of political integration
are objectionable and almost unattainable
then they are mirrored by the military
constraints on a ‘European Army’. At
present the US provides almost all NATO’s
significant strategic assets – nuclear,
conventional firepower, communications,
lift, logistics and intelligence, and, more
significantly, co-ordination. That’s not to
downplay the British and European
contributions, without which, ironically the
US is constrained, but the strategic initiative
lies with the US. Quite rightly, the last
Conservative government was keen to
support greater European co-operation and
integration in NATO, and see the WEU fulfil
a real role which complemented rather than
supported NATO. Ironically, the British and
French at the military level have many
common interests, experiences, and
professional characteristics, and close
co-operation makes sense. But it is a
another matter to talk of creating a
‘European Army’. This would necessitate
the functional fusion of defence policy,
defence industrial recruitment policy,
training and the ethos of a rich variety of
European armed forces. To gain an
advantage at a European level we would lose
all those national military attributes, which
make our individual armies effective at so
many other levels.
The responsibility of any British govern-
ment is to exercise a foreign and security
policy which promotes and protects British
interests. Above all else it should not weaken
the ultimate ability of a British government
to use military force on its own to defend
British interests, citizens or national
territory. Total military independence is not
a realistic policy and most assumptions
made by the last Conservative government
were based upon close co-operation with
allies. But the ultimate responsibility to
deploy British armed forces and to exercise
national power must remain with a British
government. The creation of a ‘European
Army’ would be the ultimate erosion of
national sovereignty. Mr Blair’s trail on a
‘European Army’ bares comparison with his
policy initiatives on devolution and
constitutional change before the general
election – not clearly thought through,
incomplete, and ultimately a threat to the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
Keith Simpson is Conservative MP for Mid-
Norfolk and a Front Bench Defence
Spokesman. He was Senior Lecturer in War
Studies at the Royal Military Academy,
Sandhurst from 1973 to 1986.
… news in brief
German banks disappointed by new government
The head of Commerzbank has expressed his disappointment with the
start of the new Social Democratic government. Speaking in his capacity
as President of the Federal Union of German Banks, Martin Kohlhausen
regretted the public argument between it and the Bundesbank and said
that its new economic policy lacked coherence. “If you push forwards on
the port side and backwards on starboard you go around in a circle”,
said Martin Kohlhausen. He also attacked the idea of setting up
exchange rate corridors between the euro, the yen and the dollar as
“counterproductive”. Only a stable euro, he said, could solve
unemployment in Europe. [Handelsblatt, 17th November 1998]
Lafontaine back-pedals
The new German Finance Minister has said that he agrees with the
Bundesbank on interest rate and monetary policy and that the primary
goal should be price stability. There had been no argument between him
and Frankfurt, he insisted, speaking at a meeting of the French and
German finance ministers and central bank chiefs. Lafontaine also
retracted his earlier suggestion that there should be a sort of planetary
ERM for all the world’s currencies. [Handelsblatt, 17th November 1998]
It is unlikely, however, that this is anything other than a matter of image
making. Lafontaine remains committed to the principle of stimulating
growth in the European economies, as does his opposite partner in
France, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.
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The UK, the Euro and the Treasury Tests
by Brian Burkitt
In October 1997 the Treasury  constructed five economic tests to be
met before Britain entered EMU. Therefore
it is timely to analyse how far these tests
have been reached and, if not, whether they
can be attained in the early years of the next
century, when it is widely assumed that the
present government will be planning a
referendum and preparing the UK for EMU
membership.
Test One: Are business cycles and economic
structures compatible, so that the UK could
live comfortably with an EU-wide monetary
policy on a permanent basis?
There is no sign of such convergence.
Indeed UK exports to the EU actually fell in
1997, whilst exports to the rest of the world
rose on an accelerating trend. Neither the
Bank of England nor the Treasury has
developed any programme to produce
cyclical of structural convergence between
the British and continental economies.
Specifically, the Monetary Policy Commit-
tee of the Bank of England is not attempting
to co-ordinate with other EU interest rates,
but focuses upon running monetary policy
to secure the government’s prescribed
inflation target.
Moreover, the Government’s Spending
Review ensured that UK interest rates will
remain higher for longer than if the Chan-
cellor had not boosted public expenditure.
Therefore the rate of interest differential
between the UK and Euroland will widen.
By making it harder to join EMU, the
government is demonstrating that domestic
policy is its primary concern. Additionally
the relationship between the pound and the
deutschmark remains unsustainable. If
sterling was merged with the euro at
approximately the current £-DM rate,
businesses would go bankrupt, jobs be lost
and the public finances move into deficit.
As for structural divergences, such as the
acute sensitivity of the UK economy to
changes in interest rates or the British
balance of payments’ unique dependence
on earnings from overseas investments, no
trends have emerged to indicate that they
will disappear. Nor has the government
introduced any policy measures designed to
remove them. Therefore the pursuit of
structural convergence remains a chimera.
Test Two: If economic crises occur does
sufficient flexibility in product and labour
Test Three: Would joining EMU create
better conditions for firms making long term
investment decisions in the UK?
Economic convergence, both cyclical and
structural, is central to attaining the
investment criteria. As already argued, there
is no indication that the UK is converging,
or will converge, with the continental
economies. Especially, in the improbable
event that convergence took place, changes
in demand, productivity and technical
progress, inevitable in a dynamic economy,
would soon re-establish divergence. So too
will the impact of a uniform EU-wide
monetary policy. Moreover, UK inward
investment is threatened by the loss of the
UK’s competitive tax regime due to EU
attempts at fiscal harmonisation.
Test Four: What impact would EMU entry
exert upon the competitive position of the
UK’s financial services industry ?
The City of London’s dominance has not
been threatened by the government’s
decision to opt out from the launch of the
single currency on 1st January 1999. Nor is
it likely to be given the substantial
competitive advantages the City enjoys over
all its EU rivals. Conversely, EMU
participation will undermine the City’s
supremacy if the European Commission’s
plans to promote tax harmonisation
proceed. A contemporary example is the
Commission’s proposal to impose a 20% tax
on interest paid on international bonds, the
chief method whereby governments, larger
corporations and banks raise funds. The
results for Britain would be catastrophic.
75% of all this business currently increasing
by a trillion dollars a year is conducted
through London, helping the City to be
easily the biggest overseas earner in the UK
economy. The immediate impact of the
Commission’s tax, scheduled to be levied
from 1st January 2001, would be a loss of an
annual gross revenue of £1 billion and
11,000 jobs, although the long term effects
will run much wider as investors switch
their transactions outside the EU. The
episode illustrates how much the City of
London has to lose if its is incorporated
within EU financial regulations.
Test Five: Will joining EMU provide greater
stability, higher growth and a permanent
increase in jobs ?
The achievement of cyclical and structural
convergence is essential for meeting the
growth and jobs test, yet neither is likely to
occur over the foreseeable future. In these
circumstances EMU membership will
reduce growth and destroy jobs in Britain. It
is clearly not supported by the weight of
economic evidence.
Summary: British participation in EMU
could only be an economic success if per-
manent cyclical and structural convergence
existed between the UK and the euro zone
economies. Such a situation is far from
being established, whilst on the experience
of the last year there is no evidence of trends
or policies leading to convergence. The
conclusion is that EMU membership will
make Britain poorer.
Dr Brian Burkitt is Senior Lecturer in
Economics at the University of Bradford.
markets exist for them to adjust rapidly and
efficiently?
The current government is attempting to
improve skills flexibility, but, by signing up
to the Social Chapter, it will create
additional rigidities. More importantly, no
strategy has been devised to reduce the
cultural and linguistic barriers to labour
mobility across the euro zone, which is a
crucial determinant of EMU’s success or
failure. Consequently this test (largely
outside UK control) cannot be met in the
foreseeable future.
UK exports to the EU
actually fell in 1997,
whilst exports to the rest
of the world rose on an
accelerating trend
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The New European Way
A group of European Socialists, Social
Democratic Finance Ministers, and Finance
spokespersons from the Party of European
Socialists,  adopted an illuminating policy
agenda last month. Gordon Brown signed the
document for the UK.
The document, ‘ The New European Way To A
People’s Europe’, is the group’s response to the
effect of globalisation. The group argues that
the benefits of globalisation are unevenly
distributed and lead to social exclusion. The
‘new European way’ will combine “ a new
economic dynamism with a well-established
commitment to solidarity, equal opportunities,
and social justice.”
Economic Reform Policies
The Socialists and Social Democrats desire
to adopt an outward looking strategy
characterised by helping markets to work
and eliminating the barriers to free trade.  To
achieve a successful outward-looking strategy,
the agenda calls for strong governance within
Europe.  The agenda states that the ECB “has
to” conduct macroeconomic policies in order
to attain ‘full employment’ and sustained
fiscal discipline, while at the same time ensure
economic flexibility in the case of an
economic downturn.
Significantly, the ‘New European Way’ policies
involve all the EU members, in or out of EMU.
This is particularly important in the case of
tax, where harmonisation to prevent ‘harmful
competition’ is planned for all countries,
although EMU makes it logical for just the
eleven.
The Social Agenda
Juggling strong economic policy with a
commitment to social justice is central to
the New European Way.  The authors strive
to ensure a framework in which “ Europe’s
workforce can continually adapt to a rapidly
changing world.”  The agenda calls for active
labour market policies that involve investment
in early education, improving skills of the
workforce, and unemployment spending that is
focused on preparing people to return to work.
The new way includes ‘an active state’ and
large public sector that takes up the “core
competences of creating a stable macro-
economic framework and common rules for
competition.”  With some foreboding, the
agenda promises a “new culture of regulation.”
Comment on the ‘New European Way’ has
questioned whether it is an agenda, or just a
rhetorical policy statement.
Advertisement for a Public Meeting
Britain in Europe – the facts
“We joined a Common Market
BUT we got something else.”
A meeting has been called in
Falmouth and surrounding districts
on Tuesday 8th December for 7.30 pm at the
Arts Centre, Falmouth
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‘Aiming for the Heart of Europe:
A Misguided Venture’
by John Bercow, MP
with a foreword by






and a new relationship
with the European Union
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